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THE AFTERMATH OF CATASTROPHES: 
VALUING BUSINESS INTERRUPTION 
INSURANCE LOSSES 
Christopher C. French* 
ABSTRACT 
With the onslaught of tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods in recent 
years, business interruption losses have been staggering. Many 
businesses do not survive such catastrophes. Even business owners 
that purchased business interruption insurance, which is intended to 
ensure that a business’s revenue stream continues during an 
interruption in its operations, often find that their insurers have 
dramatically different views regarding the amount of the losses that 
should be reimbursed. The reason for this disparity in views is that 
the loss valuation provisions in business interruption insurance 
policies provide very little guidance regarding how business 
interruption losses should be calculated. Thus, disputes regarding the 
valuation of business interruption losses frequently arise and courts 
and juries are forced to resolve such disputes with widely varying, 
inconsistent, and unpredictable results. This lack of predictability has 
placed a burden on the legal system because far more business 
interruption cases are tried than are necessary. 
This Article analyzes the origins and purpose of business 
interruption insurance, as well as the courts’ inconsistent 
interpretations of the standard form business interruption loss 
valuation provisions. The Article then offers an interpretation of the 
existing loss valuation provisions under the rules of policy 
interpretation and considers whether the result would be different if 
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the language were analyzed from a product liability perspective in 
light of the fact that policies are non-negotiated contracts of adhesion 
sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. The Article concludes with an 
analysis of the public policy considerations related to the payment of 
business interruption insurance losses and proposes alternative loss 
valuation formulas to be used in the future that should provide for 
consistent, fair and predictable loss valuations and payment of claims 
without litigation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Business interruption losses caused by natural and unnatural 
disasters are enormous. For example, the business interruption losses 
associated with the 9/11 terrorist attack have been estimated to 
exceed $10 billion.
1
 Hurricane Katrina caused more than $45 billion 
in damage.
2
 The governors of New York and New Jersey estimated 
that Hurricane Sandy caused more than $60 billion in damages.
3
 
                                                                                                                 
 1. DANIEL T. TORPEY, DANIEL G. LENTZ & ALLEN MELTON, BUSINESS INTERRUPTION:  
COVERAGE, CLAIMS, AND RECOVERY 4 (2d ed. 2011). 
 2. Gregory D. Miller & Joseph D. Jean, Effect of Post-Loss Economic Factors in Measuring 
Business Interruption Losses: An Insured’s and Insurer’s Perspectives, in NEW APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE: CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAW 25, 25 (2010). 
 3. Editorial, Hurricane Sandy’s Rising Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2012, at A32. 
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Many businesses impacted by such disasters never recover. Indeed, 
the United States Department of Labor has estimated that 40% of 
businesses never reopen after experiencing a disaster.
4
 Of those that 
do, at least 25% fail within two years.
5
 
Now imagine a business owner in an area that was just struck by a 
flood, tornado, or hurricane. The business was damaged such that 
operations had to be suspended. Lucky for the business owner, 
however, he was able to resume operations in a few weeks or months 
after repairs were made. Even better, he had the foresight to purchase 
business interruption insurance, which is intended to place the 
business owner in the position he would have occupied if the 
catastrophe had not occurred.
6
 
Yet, when the business owner submits a business interruption 
claim to the insurer, the insurer denies coverage for the claim or 
offers a paltry sum and advises the business owner that there would 
have been little or no demand for the business’s services or products 
during the time period its operations were being restored because the 
area near the business was wiped out by the disaster. Thus, the 
insurer tells the business owner that the business did not actually 
suffer a business interruption loss because very few customers or 
clients would have patronized the business following the disaster 
even if the business had not been impacted. At best, the insurer tells 
the owner, what little business he might have had would not have 
covered the business’s fixed costs such as rent and payroll.7 
Consequently, the insurance policy purchased to cover business 
interruption losses provides little or no recovery because the 
business’s projected earnings during the period of interruption would 
not have exceeded its continuing fixed costs.
8
 
                                                                                                                 
 4. John Grossman, A Business Ponders Whether Its Location is Perfect, or a Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 8, 2011, at B6. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Miller & Jean, supra note 2, at 25 (“Business interruption insurance, at its core, is intended to 
place the insured in the position it would have been in had it not suffered a loss.”); Jon C. Rice, Business 
Interruption Coverage in the Wake of Katrina: Measuring the Insured’s Loss in a Volatile Economy, 41 
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 857, 857 (2006) (“The purpose of business interruption coverage is to 
place the insured in the position it would have occupied had no interruption occurred.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Cont’l Ins. Co. v. DNE Corp., 834 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tenn. 1992). 
 8. Id. 
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Unfortunately, this is not a fictional scenario. It is all too real and it 
is regularly experienced by many business owners throughout 
America. There are countless business owners in New Jersey and 
New York that are currently going through such an experience right 
now in the wake of Hurricane Sandy. 
Insurers take such a position due to the nebulous wording of the 
loss valuation provisions buried in lengthy, complex, standard form 
business interruption insurance policies that insurers draft and then 
sell on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
9
 The loss valuation language often 
is worded as follows: 
In determining the amount of gross earnings covered hereunder 
for the purposes of ascertaining the amount of loss sustained, due 
consideration shall be given to the experience of the business 
before the date of the damage or destruction and to the probable 
experience thereafter had no loss occurred.
10
 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Wagner v. Yates, 912 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ind. 2009) (“[T]he insurer drafts the policy and foists its 
terms upon the customer.”); 401 Fourth Street, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Grp., 879 A.2d 166, 171 (Pa. 2005) 
(“[T]he insurer drafts the policy, and controls coverage.”). See also 1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF 
INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 4.06(b), at 4-37 (2d ed. Supp. 2005) (“In a sense, the typical 
insurance contract is one of ‘super-adhesion’ in that the contract is completely standardized and not 
even reviewed prior to contract formation.”); Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy 
Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 534 (1996); Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The 
Tested Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2010) (describing the “hyperstandardization” 
of insurance policies); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of 
Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 996 (1992) (“The only part of the standard 
policy that is generally customized to the consumer-insured is the Declarations Sheet . . . . [T]here is 
little, if any, freedom to negotiate the standardized language of the insurance contract that determines 
the scope of coverage.”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 
1945: Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 18 (1993); Susan 
Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 125 (2007) (“[I]n some lines of 
insurance, all insurance companies provide identical coverage on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); 
Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263, 1266–67, 
1276 (2011) (citing sources that discuss the standardization of insurance policies and then arguing 
homeowners insurance policies are not as standardized as other lines of insurance); Kent D. Syverud, 
The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1153 (1990) (“[P]roperty owner’s liability insurance contracts 
are standardized across insurers in a form few insureds have the power or experience to bargain 
around.”). 
 10. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis 
added). 
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Insurers rely upon the above italicized language when they attempt 
to support the argument that business interruption losses are 
negligible or non-existent in situations where the area surrounding a 
business has been destroyed by a catastrophe such that the demand 
for the impacted business’s services or products has been greatly 
reduced or eliminated.
11
 Other times, if the catastrophe results in 
increased demand for the policyholder’s services or products, then 
the insurers argue only the pre-catastrophe sales and expenses of the 
policyholder should be used to value the loss.
12
 
Some courts have accepted the argument that the economic 
conditions post-catastrophe should be considered when valuing 
business interruption losses.
13
 Other courts have not.
14
 Courts also 
have disagreed regarding which elements of a business interruption 
loss are recoverable.
15
 In addition, some courts have required the 
policyholder to prove the amount of any business interruption loss to 
a “reasonable degree of certainty” even though such calculations are, 
by necessity, only projections regarding what the policyholder would 
have earned in the hypothetical world in which the catastrophe did 
not occur.
16
 All of these inconsistencies and problems reflected in the 
courts’ decisions flow from the nebulous valuation language that is 
contained in business interruption policies. 
In this Article, the author contends that if the existing policy 
language continues to be used, then the ambiguities in it should be 
construed in favor of policyholders and against insurers, which 
should lead to inconsistent results that consistently favor 
policyholders. A better approach, however, would be to redraft the 
loss valuation provisions. Instead of using the vague loss valuation 
language that currently exists, business interruption policies should 
include a stated daily loss value for business interruption claims, 
which already is developed and used during the underwriting 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. See infra Part II.C. 
 16. See infra notes 120, 121. 
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process.
17
 The stated daily loss value is the amount, at the time the 
policy is placed, that the policyholder is projected to lose on a daily 
basis if its operations are interrupted.
18
 It is a number that is derived 
from the policyholder’s current expense and revenue data and is 
revised annually during the policy renewal process so it always is up 
to date. Insurers already use the number during the underwriting 
process to assess the risk and establish the amount of the premium.
19
 
Alternatively, only the policyholder’s earnings and cost data for the 
three years prior to the business interruption could be used to value 
business interruption losses. Using a three-year time period should 
account for the seasonal or cyclical nature of some businesses’ 
revenue streams. 
The advantages of using either proposal are that they establish a 
fixed number that is agreed to by the parties at the time the policy is 
placed regarding the amount a policyholder will be paid if its 
operations are interrupted. Both proposals would eliminate debates 
between the parties regarding the state of the economy, the trends in 
the policyholder’s industry, and the impact the catastrophe had on the 
local business climate. Such debates are at the center of the current 
litigation regarding business interruption losses and they result in an 
enormous waste of the parties’ and courts’ resources as cases 
unnecessarily wind their way through the legal system and are 
ultimately presented to juries because the outcomes of the cases are 
unpredictable under the existing policy language.
20
 Thus, if adopted, 
either proposal would provide consistent, predictable results and the 
efficient resolution of claims without the necessity of litigation in 
most instances. 
This Article addresses these issues in four parts. Part One 
discusses the origins and purpose of business interruption insurance, 
which is to ensure that the policyholder’s revenue stream continues 
during the period of interruption, as well as the policy language 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See infra note 216. 
 18. Stan Johnson & Kevin O’Toole, Common Business Interruption Measurement Disputes, 19 
JOHN LINER REV. 59, 65 (2005). 
 19. See infra note 216. 
 20. See infra Part II. 
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relevant to the valuation of business interruption losses. Part Two 
discusses the conflicting court opinions regarding the valuation of 
business interruption losses. Part Three discusses the rules of policy 
interpretation that are relevant to interpreting and applying the 
existing policy language. Part Three also explores the idea that, in 
light of the fact that policies are non-negotiated contracts of adhesion 
sold on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the loss valuation language can be 
viewed as a defective product if the policy fails to perform as 
reasonably expected by the policyholder (i.e., the policyholder does 
not receive payment from the insurer for the full amount of the 
policyholder’s business interruption loss). Part Four discusses the 
problems with the existing policy language and current approaches to 
valuing business interruption losses. Part Four also discusses public 
policy considerations, such as the importance of ensuring that 
policyholders receive the benefit of the bargain for the premiums 
they paid, and ensuring that the socially important purpose of 
insurance—transferring the risk of losses from individuals and 
businesses to insurers—is not frustrated by insurers’ interest in 
maximizing their profits by minimizing the amounts they pay for 
catastrophic losses by relying upon vaguely-worded loss valuation 
provisions they themselves drafted and buried in policies that often 
exceed fifty pages of single-spaced terms, conditions and exclusions. 
The Article concludes with the author’s proposal that instead of using 
the existing policy language, the policies either should contain a daily 
loss value or specify that only the policyholders’ prior three years of 
revenue and cost data will be used to calculate business interruption 
losses. If insurers will not voluntarily redraft the loss valuation 
language to clarify how business interruption losses will be 
calculated, then the author proposes that: (1) courts should construe 
the nebulous loss valuation language strictly against insurers as 
required under the existing rules of policy interpretation, and (2) 
legislatures should enact legislation that dictates how business 
interruption losses will be valued in accordance with one of the 
proposals made in this Article. 
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I.   RELEVANT POLICY LANGUAGE 
A.   The Origins of Business Interruption Insurance 
The genealogy of business interruption insurance begins over two 
hundred years ago and has its roots in insurance that was issued to 
protect property owners’ rental income.21 Because property insurance 
historically did not protect against lost rent, separate coverage had to 
be purchased.
22
 Originally, such insurance was referred to as “use 
and occupancy” insurance.23 In the 1930s, the name evolved to 
business interruption insurance and in the 1980s the Insurance 
Services Office (ISO) coined the term “business income insurance” 
when it issued a new policy form for business interruption 
insurance.
24
 
As many courts and commentators have stated, the purpose of 
business interruption insurance is to return the policyholder to the 
position it would have occupied if the disaster had not occurred: 
The purpose of business interruption insurance is to protect the 
insured against losses that occur when its operations are 
unexpectedly interrupted, and to place it in the position it would 
have occupied if the interruption had not occurred.
25
 
The modern forms of business interruption insurance, which cover 
net profits plus continuing expenses such as payroll and taxes, were 
introduced in the mid-1920s.
26
 There currently are two common 
business interruption policy forms: 1) Gross Earnings and 2) 
Business Income.
27
 Gross Earnings forms calculate business 
                                                                                                                 
 21. TORPEY, LENTZ & MELTON, supra note 1, at 1. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 5. Use and occupancy insurance typically had a loss per day value set forth in the policy. 
Id. at 6. Consequently, there was no need for, and little room to, debate what the amount of lost income 
was in the event of a business interruption. Id. 
 24. Id. at 5. 
 25. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. DNE Corp., 834 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Nw. States Portland 
Cement Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 360 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1966)). See also Miller & Jean, supra note 
2, at 25; Rice, supra note 6, at 857. 
 26. TORPEY, LENTZ & MELTON, supra note 1, at 8. 
 27. Id. at 9, 14 (describing the gross earnings form and the business income form). See also David A. 
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interruption losses from the top down, which means the business 
interruption loss is the total amount the policyholder would have 
earned if not for the interruption of its operations less the costs or 
expenses the policyholder did not incur due to the interruption in its 
business (i.e., the variable costs it saved because its operations were 
suspended).
28
 Business Income forms calculate business interruption 
losses from the bottom up, which means the business interruption 
loss is the net income the policyholder would have earned if not for 
the interruption plus the policyholder’s continuing fixed expenses 
such as payroll and taxes.
29
 In theory, the amount of a business 
interruption loss should be the same under the two policy forms.
30
 
B.   The Policy Language Regarding the Valuation of Business 
Interruption Losses 
Although there are many minor variations in the wording used in 
business interruption policies because insurers often have their own 
policy form that they prefer to use, all such forms are drafted by 
insurers.
31
 The policies are contracts of adhesion and sold on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis.
32
 One common version of the insuring agreement 
language found in Gross Earnings policy forms provides: 
[The insurer] shall be liable for the ACTUAL LOSS 
SUSTAINED by insured resulting directly from such 
interruption of business, but not exceeding the reduction in gross 
earnings less charges and expenses which do not necessarily 
                                                                                                                 
Borghesi, Business Interruption Insurance: A Business Perspective, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1147, 1150 
(1993) (discussing the types of business interruption policy forms); Lori R. Keeton, Business 
Interruption Coverage in the Wake of the Gulf Coast Oil Spill: The Devil Is in the Details, ASPATORE 
(Mar. 2011), 2011 WL 971800, at *6. 
 28. TORPEY, LENTZ & MELTON, supra note 1, at 10–12; Borghesi, supra note 27, at 1150; Keeton, 
supra note 27, at *6. 
 29. TORPEY, LENTZ & MELTON, supra note 1, at 15; Borghesi, supra note 27, at 1150; Keeton, supra 
note 27, at *6. 
 30. Borghesi, supra note 27, at 1150. 
 31. See supra note 9. 
 32. Id. 
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continue during the interruption . . . .
33
 
In short, the policyholder is entitled to recover its lost gross earnings 
less saved variable expenses. 
A common version of the insuring agreement language used in 
Business Income policy forms is worded as follows: 
[The insurer] will pay an insured during its period of suspended 
business operation the “(i) Net Income (Net Profit or Loss before 
income taxes) that would have been earned or incurred if no 
physical loss or damage had occurred . . . ; and (ii) Continuing 
normal operating expenses incurred, including payroll[.]”
34
 
In short, the policyholder is entitled to recover its net profits plus 
fixed continuing expenses. 
The loss valuation provisions are commonly worded as follows: 
In determining the amount of gross earnings covered hereunder 
for the purposes of ascertaining the amount of loss sustained, due 
consideration shall be given to the experience of the business 
before the date of the damage or destruction and to the probable 
experience thereafter had no loss occurred.
35
 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005). For similar 
insuring agreement language, see also Catlin Syndicate Ltd. v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc., 600 F.3d 
511, 514 (5th Cir. 2010); Prudential LMI Commercial Ins. Co. v. Colleton Enters., Inc., No. 91-1757, 
1992 WL 252507, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 5, 1992); Consol. Cos. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 06-4700, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8542, at *16–17 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 2009); Berk-Cohen Assocs. v. Landmark Am. Ins. 
Co., No. 07-9205, 2009 WL 2777163, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2009); B.F. Carvin Constr. Co. v. CNA 
Ins. Co., No. 06-7155, 2008 WL 5784516, at *1 (E.D. La. July 14, 2008); Levitz Furniture Corp. v. 
Hous. Cas. Co., No. 96-1790, 1997 WL 218256, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 1997); Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Fisherman’s Paradise Boats, Inc., No. 93-2349CIVGRAHAM, 1994 WL 1720238, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 
3, 1994). 
 34. Amerigraphics, Inc. v. Mercury Cas. Co., 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 312 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) 
(quoting policy language). For similar insuring agreement language, see also Catlin Syndicate Ltd., 600 
F.3d at 514; Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314; Prudential LMI Commercial Ins. Co., 1992 WL 252507, 
at *1; Consol. Cos., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8542, at *16–17; Berk-Cohen, 2009 WL 2777163, at *4; 
B.F. Carvin Constr. Co., 2008 WL 5784516, at *1; Levitz Furniture Corp., 1997 WL 218256, at *3; Am. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 1994 WL 1720238, at *3. 
 35. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314 (emphasis added). See also cases cited infra notes 44, 67. 
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Notably, the term “gross earnings” is not defined in the policies.36 
Also, this language clearly contemplates doing a projection regarding 
the business’s “probable experience” if the loss had not occurred.37 
Another version of the valuation language that also is often used 
provides: 
We’ll cover your actual loss of earnings and extra expenses 
incurred because of necessary or potential interruption of 
business . . . . In figuring earnings, we’ll weigh the performance 
of your business before the loss and what its performance 
probably would have been afterwards had no loss occurred.
38
 
Again, the language contemplates that an analysis will be conducted 
regarding what the policyholder’s hypothetical “performance 
probably would have been” if no loss had occurred.39 
II.   COURTS’ INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE POLICY 
LANGUAGE REGARDING THE VALUATION OF BUSINESS INTERRUPTION 
LOSSES 
Due to the broad language used in the loss valuation provisions of 
business interruption insurance, the use of many undefined terms, 
and the fact that a formula for valuing business interruption losses is 
not actually contained in such provisions, it should come as no 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Cohen Furniture Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Co. of Ill., 573 N.E.2d 851, 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) 
(emphasis added). See also cases cited infra notes 44, 67. 
 39. Notably, some policies contain language that specifically precludes the consideration of 
policyholder-favorable economic conditions post-loss when valuing the business interruption loss. Such 
policies commonly are worded as follows: 
The amount of Business Income loss will be determined based on: 
(1) The Net Income of the business before the direct physical loss or damage occurred; 
(2) The likely Net Income of the business if no physical loss or damage occurred, but not 
including any likely increase in Net Income attributable to an increase in the volume of 
business as a result of favorable business conditions caused by the impact of the Covered 
Cause of loss on customers or on other businesses . . . . 
Legier & Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., No. 09-6674, 2010 WL 1731202, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 
28, 2010). See also Berk-Cohen Assocs, 2009 WL 2777163, at *3; Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. 
Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 552 F. Supp. 2d 637, 640 (S.D. Tex. 2007). 
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surprise that the courts’ decisions regarding how business 
interruption losses should be valued are varied and inconsistent. 
Some courts interpret the valuation language to require that the loss 
calculation be based upon only the historical financial data of the 
policyholder.
40
 Other courts also allow the local post-catastrophe 
economic conditions to be considered.
41
 In addition, when applying 
the standard valuation language to claims that arise under similar 
factual scenarios, the courts have reached patently inconsistent 
conclusions regarding which of the policyholder’s ongoing expenses 
are recoverable.
42
 One consistency, however, does appear in the 
decisions—the courts are confused regarding the evidentiary standard 
that should apply when a policyholder is attempting to prove the 
amount of its business interruption loss.
43
 
A.   Courts That Have Interpreted the Loss Valuation Language to 
Allow for Consideration of Only Historical Financial Data 
One school of thought, which most notably has been endorsed by 
the Fifth Circuit, only considers the historical financial data of the 
policyholder when calculating business interruption losses.
44
 In 
Finger Furniture,
45
 the policyholder owned seven furniture stores in 
Houston, Texas.
46
 Tropical Storm Allison hit the Houston area and 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See infra Part II.A. 
 41. See infra Part II.B. 
 42. See infra Part II.C. 
 43. See infra Part II.D. 
 44. Catlin Syndicate Ltd. v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc., 600 F.3d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(following Finger Furniture and only allowing the use of historical financial information when 
determining a business interruption loss); Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 
312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005) (allowing only historical financial information to be used to predict 
policyholder’s “probable experience” during period of interruption); Prudential LMI Commercial Ins. 
Co. v. Colleton Enters., Inc., No. 91-1757, 1992 WL 252507, at *4 (4th Cir. Oct. 5, 1992) (disallowing 
the policyholder to calculate its business interruption loss based upon favorable post-loss economic 
environment created by a hurricane); Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fisherman’s Paradise Boats, Inc., No. 93-
2349CIVGRAHAM, 1994 WL 1720238, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 1994) (citing Colleton, 1992 WL 
252507, at *2) (finding increased demand for policyholder’s products due to favorable economic 
environment created by a hurricane cannot be considered when valuing the policyholder’s business 
interruption loss). 
 45. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 46. Id. at 313. 
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caused severe flooding.
47
 As a result, the policyholder could not open 
its stores for a period of time.
48
 Consequently, the policyholder 
submitted a business interruption loss claim to its insurer.
49
 The 
parties could not agree on the amount of the business interruption 
loss, litigation ensued, and ultimately the parties filed cross motions 
for summary judgment.
50
 The policy at issue contained the following 
language: 
In determining the amount of gross earnings covered hereunder 
for the purposes of ascertaining the amount of loss sustained, due 
consideration shall be given to the experience of the business 
before the date of the damage or destruction and to the probable 
experience thereafter had no loss occurred.
51
 
Relying upon the “probable experience thereafter” policy 
language, the insurer argued the policyholder did not actually suffer a 
business interruption loss because demand for furniture in the area 
was high after the tropical storm passed and the policyholder was 
able to quickly make up the sales allegedly lost during the period of 
interruption.
52
 The Fifth Circuit rejected the insurer’s argument and 
held that only the policyholder’s historical sales figures could be used 
to calculate the loss.
53
 In explaining its decision, the court stated: 
The policy language indicates that a business-interruption loss 
will be based on historical sales figures. Specifically, the policy 
states that “due consideration shall be given to the experience of 
the business before the date of the damage or destruction and to 
the probable experience thereafter had no loss occurred.” 
Historical sales figures reflect a business’s experience before the 
date of the damage or destruction and predict a company’s 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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probable experience had the loss not occurred. The strongest and 
most reliable evidence of what a business would have done had 
the catastrophe not occurred is what it had been doing in the 
period just before the interruption.
54
 
The court further explained that, contrary to the insurer’s position, 
the policy did not expressly state that post-catastrophe sales should 
be considered when determining what the sales would have been had 
the storm not occurred: 
[T]he business-loss provision says nothing about taking into 
account actual post-damage sales to determine what the insured 
would have experienced had the storm not occurred. The 
contract language does not suggest that the insurer can look 
prospectively to what occurred after the loss to determine 
whether its insured incurred a business-interruption loss. Instead, 
the policy requires due consideration of the business’s 
experience before the date of the loss and the business’s probable 
experience had the loss not occurred. [The policyholder’s] 
historical sales figures reflect that consideration.
55
 
Thus, in this instance, the court’s decision not to consider the post-
catastrophe economic conditions favored the policyholder. 
Five years later, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to 
considering only the policyholder’s historical financial information 
when valuing business interruption losses in Catlin Syndicated Ltd. v. 
Imperial Palace of Mississippi, Inc.
56
 In Catlin, the policyholder 
operated a casino that was damaged by Hurricane Katrina. 
57
The 
casino was shut down for several months, but when it reopened “its 
revenues were . . . greater than before the hurricane[,]” because 
“many [of the] nearby casinos remained closed.”58 In valuing the 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Catlin Syndicate Ltd. v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc., 600 F.3d 511, 516 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 57. Id. at 512. 
 58. Id. 
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business interruption loss for the casino, there was a $100 million 
discrepancy between the policyholder’s calculation, which was based 
in part upon the business’s post-hurricane experience, and the 
insurer’s calculation, which was based upon only the business’s pre-
hurricane experience.
59
 
The valuation language in the policy at issue was worded as 
follows: “In determining the amount of the Time Element60 loss as 
insured against by this policy, due consideration shall be given to 
experience of the business before the loss and the probable 
experience thereafter had no loss occurred.”61 With each party 
arguing that the court should adopt their interpretation of the policy 
language, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
62
 
The court, relying upon Finger Furniture, held only the historical 
sales information could be used to calculate the loss.
63
 The court 
explained its reasoning as follows: 
Finger Furniture tells us “that a business-interruption loss will 
be based on historical sales figures,” and that we should not 
“look prospectively to what occurred after the loss.” Thus, in the 
business-interruption provision at hand, only historical sales 
figures should be considered when determining loss, and sales 
figures after reopening should not be taken into account.
64
 
Thus, unlike in Finger Furniture, the court’s decision not to allow 
post-catastrophe economic conditions to be considered favored the 
insurer. 
In both cases, however, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the “probable 
experience thereafter” phrase to mean the probable experience the 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. at 512–13. 
 60. Business interruption insurance is a type of insurance that sometimes is referred to as “time 
element” insurance, because the period of time a business is interrupted is one of the principal factors 
involved in valuing the loss. Bernard P. Bell, General Purpose of Time Element Insurance, in 5 NEW 
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 46.01 (2013). 
 61. Catlin, 600 F.3d at 513. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 516. 
 64. Id. (citing Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005)). 
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policyholder would have had post-catastrophe, assuming the 
policyholder’s post-catastrophe experience would be identical to its 
pre-catastrophe experience.
65
 Several courts in other jurisdictions 
have reached similar conclusions.
66
 
B.   Courts That Have Interpreted the Loss Valuation Language to 
Allow for the Consideration of Local Economic Conditions Post-
Catastrophe 
At the other end of the spectrum, several courts have held that 
local post-catastrophe economic conditions should be considered 
when business interruption losses are valued.
67
 Although there are 
not enough decisions, particularly appellate decisions, on the issue to 
proclaim that any particular school of thought is the majority 
position, more courts, especially in Louisiana, have endorsed this 
approach than the Fifth Circuit’s approach.68 
A leading case, and arguably the controlling authority on the issue 
under Louisiana law, that used this approach is Sher v. Lafayette 
Insurance Co.
69
 In Sher, the policyholder owned an apartment 
building in New Orleans that was damaged by Hurricane Katrina.
70
 
Although there were multiple issues in dispute between the 
policyholder and the insurer, the primary dispute with respect to the 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 514; Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314. 
 66. See supra note 44. 
 67. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Holland Am. Line-Westours, Inc., 25 Fed. App’x 602, 603 (9th Cir. 
2002) (allowing insurer to use “make up” sales of the policyholder post-loss to reduce the amount 
owed); Consol. Cos. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 06-4700, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8542, at *20 (E.D. La. 
Jan. 23, 2009) (allowing jury to base award to policyholder upon increased demand created by 
hurricane); Berk-Cohen Assocs. v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., No. 07-9205, 2009 WL 2777163, at *5 
(E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2009) (allowing policyholder to use higher post-loss rent values when calculating its 
business interruption loss); B.F. Carvin Constr. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., No. 06-7155, 2008 WL 5784516, 
*3 (E.D. La. July 14, 2008) (finding policyholder did not suffer a business interruption loss because 
favorable economic conditions post-loss caused an increase in sales); Levitz Furniture Corp. v. Hous. 
Cas. Co., No. 96-1790, 1997 WL 218256, *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 1997) (allowing policyholder to 
calculate its business interruption loss based upon higher demand for its product caused by flooding); 
Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 973 So. 2d 39, 62 (La. Ct. App. 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 988 So. 2d 
186, 205 (La. 2008) (allowing policyholder to use higher post-loss rent values in calculating its business 
interruption loss). 
 68. See cases cited supra note 67. 
 69. Sher, 973 So. 2d at 47. 
 70. Id. 
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business interruption claim related to whether pre-Katrina or post-
Katrina rent rates should be used to value the business interruption 
loss.
71
 
The policy language at issue provided: “We will pay for the actual 
loss of Business Income you sustain due to the necessary suspension 
of your ‘operations’ during the ‘period of restoration.’”72 The 
policyholder argued that, under this language, post-Katrina rent rates 
should be used because housing had become scarce due to the 
extensive damage in the area, while the insurer argued pre-Katrina 
rates should be used.
73
 
The case was tried to a jury and the jury found in favor of the 
policyholder.
74
 On appeal, the intermediate appellate court, with little 
explanation, held that the policyholder could recover the higher post-
Katrina rent rates, stating “the Policy covers [the policyholder’s] 
‘actual loss’ of business income.”75 In making this statement, the 
court implicitly interpreted the phrase “actual loss” to mean the 
amount the policyholder would have earned if the policyholder’s 
business had not been damaged by the hurricane but the area around 
the policyholder’s business had been damaged.76 Because the jury 
agreed with the policyholder’s loss calculation using the post-Katrina 
rent rates, the court affirmed the jury verdict.
77
 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the lower courts’ rulings on 
some issues, but not the holdings regarding the valuation of the 
business interruption loss.
78
 Thus, the Louisiana state courts 
implicitly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s approach by allowing the 
consideration of post-catastrophe economic conditions in valuing the 
loss.
79
 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. at 57. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 49. 
 75. Sher, 973 So. 2d at 57. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 988 So. 2d 186, 205 (La. 2008). 
 79. See cases cited supra note 67. 
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Another Louisiana decision in which the court held the 
policyholder’s business interruption loss should be calculated based 
upon post-catastrophe economic conditions is Berk-Cohen 
Associates, LLC v. Landmark American Insurance Co.
80
 In Berk-
Cohen, the policyholder was the owner of an apartment complex that 
was damaged by “a series of unfortunate events.”81 First, a tornado 
struck the apartment complex.
82
 Two weeks later, before any repairs 
had been made, Hurricane Katrina “decimated” New Orleans and 
further damaged the apartment complex.
83
 Then, while the post-
Katrina repairs were underway, a fire broke out at the apartment 
complex.
84
 Finally, while repairs were again underway, a vehicle 
struck a transformer, which caused a power outage.
85
 From beginning 
to end, the repair work took almost two years to complete.
86
 
When valuing the business interruption loss, the parties could not 
agree on the amount of the loss because, among other reasons, the 
policyholder contended the housing shortage caused by Hurricane 
Katrina increased the rental value of the apartments by 40%.
87
 The 
insurer, on the other hand, valued the loss based upon pre-Katrina 
rates.
88
 The valuation language in the policy provided: 
The amount of Business Income loss will be determined based 
on: (1) The Net Income of the business before the direct physical 
loss or damage occurred; (2) The likely Net Income of the 
business if no physical loss or damage had occurred, but not 
including any Net Income that would likely have been earned as 
a result of an increase in the volume of business due to favorable 
business conditions caused by the impact of the Covered Cause 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Berk-Cohen Assocs. v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., No. 07-9205, 2009 WL 2777163 (E.D. La. Aug. 
27, 2009). 
 81. Id. at *1. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Berk-Cohen, 2009 WL 2777163, at *1. 
 87. Id. at *3. 
 88. Id. 
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of Loss on customers or on other businesses[.]
89
 
. . . . 
In determining the amount of gross earnings covered hereunder 
for the purposes of ascertaining the amount of loss sustained, due 
consideration shall be given to the experience of the business 
before the date of the damage or destruction and to the probable 
experience thereafter had no loss occurred.
90
 
The court held the policyholder’s recovery should be based upon 
the post-Katrina rental rates.
91
 In reaching its holding, the court 
distinguished Finger Furniture,
92
 the ostensibly controlling Fifth 
Circuit authority, by accepting the policyholder’s argument that: (1) 
the policy language at issue was different than the language in Finger 
Furniture, and (2) the policy language quoted above that provides the 
loss will not be valued based upon favorable post-catastrophe 
business conditions created by a “covered cause of loss” did not 
apply because flooding, an excluded cause of loss, as opposed to a 
covered cause of loss, created the favorable business conditions
93
 
Thus, the court allowed the policyholder to successfully circumvent 
the policy language which, on its face, appeared to preclude 
consideration of the favorable post-catastrophe business conditions in 
the area. 
Although the reasoning has varied somewhat from decision to 
decision, several other courts also have reached the conclusion that 
post-catastrophe economic conditions should be considered when 
valuing business interruption losses.
94
 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at *4 (citing Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 
2005)). 
 91. Id. at *5.  
 92. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 93. Berk-Cohen, 2009 WL 2777163, at *5. 
 94. See supra note 67. 
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C.   Courts’ Inconsistent Holdings Regarding the Application of the 
Loss Valuation Language 
In addition to disagreeing on whether post-catastrophe economic 
conditions should be considered when analyzing business 
interruption losses, the courts also have reached inconsistent 
conclusions regarding when, and whether, certain expenses are 
recoverable under the standard valuation language contained in 
business interruption policies.
95
 This inconsistency is highlighted by 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Compare Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp., 141 F.2d 443, 
446 (10th Cir. 1944) (affirming lower court’s ruling in favor of policyholder and finding “no prescribed 
formula for the determination of the actual loss of net profits and business expenses covered by the 
policy”), Legier & Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., No. 096674, 2010 WL 1731202, at *1, *3 
(E.D. La. Apr. 28, 2010) (allowing policyholder to recover net income plus continuing fixed costs but 
requiring the policyholder to credit the insurer with revenues received during the period of interruption 
and noting “the policy does not prescribe an explicit formula to calculate loss of business income”), 
Amerigraphics, Inc. v. Mercury Cas. Co., 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307, 320 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (allowing 
policyholder to recover its continuing fixed costs even if it would have suffered a loss during the period 
of interruption in the absence of a flood), and Gates v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 196 S.W.3d 761, 766–
67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (allowing policyholder to recover revenues that would have been received 
after the period of interruption so long as they were “earned” during the period of interruption), with 
Polymer Plastics Corp. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 389 F. App’x 703, 705 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
earnings made during period of interruption should be used to reduce the amount of the business 
interruption loss), Associated Photographers, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 677 F.2d 1251, 1256 (8th 
Cir. 1982) (holding the insurer can deduct the amount of saved variable expenses when calculating the 
amount of a business interruption loss), Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 360 
F.2d 531, 534 (8th Cir. 1966) (finding where inventory was sold to prevent loss of earnings during 
period of business interruption, only the extra expenses incurred to replace the inventory sold was 
recoverable), HTI Holdings, Inc. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. 10-6021-AA, 2011 WL 6205903, at *7 
(D. Or. Dec. 8, 2011) (holding that projected negative net income during period of interruption can be 
used by insurer to offset continuing fixed costs when calculating a business interruption loss amount), 
Admiral Indem. Co. v. Bouley Int’l Holding, LLC, No. 02 Civ. 9696(HB), 2003 WL 22682273, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2003) (holding amounts paid to policyholder for different use of property during 
period of interruption should be used to reduce amount of the business interruption loss), Stone 
Container Corp. v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., No. 93C6626, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3978, at *8–9 (N.D. 
Ill. Mar. 25, 1997) (finding that policyholder did not suffer a business interruption loss because it was 
able to satisfy orders by selling inventory which the policyholder did not replenish after the period of 
interruption), Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 861 N.E.2d 263, 271 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2006) (holding insurer can use policyholder’s sales during period of interruption to reduce amount of 
policyholder’s loss), Lyon Metal Prods., LLC v. Prot. Mut. Ins. Co., 747 N.E.2d 495, 504 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2001) (finding insurer can offset payments made for damaged inventory when calculating the value of 
the business interruption loss), Cohen Furniture Co. v. St. Paul Ins. Co. of Ill., 573 N.E.2d 851, 857 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1991) (holding policyholder cannot recover depreciation for a completely destroyed building 
because depreciation is not a continuing expense under business interruption insurance in that 
circumstance), J&R Elecs. Inc. v. One Beacon Ins. Co., No. 603284/2004, 2005 WL 4257996, at *2 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 2005) (holding policyholder cannot recover for damaged merchandise under 
both property damage provisions of policy and business interruption provisions of policy), Cont’l Ins. 
Co. v. DNE Corp., 834 S.W.2d 930, 934 (Tenn. 1992) (finding insurer must add projected net income 
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the courts’ treatment of the issue of whether a policyholder can 
recover its continuing fixed expenses such as rent and payroll in 
situations where the policyholder likely would have lost money 
during the period of interruption, even if its operations had not been 
interrupted.
96
 
Consider again the insuring agreement provisions commonly 
found in standard business interruption policies: 
[The insurer] will pay an insured during its period of suspended 
business operation the “(i) Net Income (Net Profit or Loss before 
income taxes) that would have been earned or incurred if no 
physical loss or damage had occurred . . . ; and (ii) Continuing 
normal operating expenses incurred, including payroll[.]”
97
 
Thus, a question that arises is whether a policyholder can recover its 
continuing operating expenses during the period of interruption if it 
was actually losing money prior to the business interruption and was 
projected to continue losing money during the period of interruption 
even if the interruption had not occurred. In other words, does one 
add together the projected “net income” and “continuing operating 
expenses” in determining the recoverable loss or are the “continuing 
operating expenses” recoverable regardless of whether the “net 
income” figure is positive or negative? 
                                                                                                                 
and continuing expenses together when calculating a business interruption claim even if the net income 
number is negative), and Keetch v. Mut. of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 831 P.2d 784, 786 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1992) (holding decrease in business activity due to a partial interruption of business, as opposed to a 
complete interruption of business, is not a reimbursable business interruption loss). 
 96. Compare Amerigraphics, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 318 (allowing insured to recover its continuing 
fixed costs), with DNE, 834 S.W.2d at 934 (denying insured recovery of business income). 
 97. Amerigraphics, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 312. See also Catlin Syndicate Ltd. v. Imperial Palace of 
Miss., Inc., 600 F.3d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 2010); Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314; Prudential LMI 
Commercial Ins. Co. v. Colleton Enters., Inc., No. 91-1757, 1992 WL 252507, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 5, 
1992); Berk-Cohen, 2009 WL 2777163, at *4; Consol. Cos. v. Lexington Ins., No. 06-4700, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8542, at *16–17 (E.D. La. Jan. 23, 2009); B.F. Carvin Constr. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., No. 
06-4700, 2008 WL 5784516, at *1 (E.D. La. July 14, 2008); Levitz Furniture Corp. v. Hous. Cas. Co., 
No. 96-1790, 1997 WL 218256, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 1997); Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fisherman’s 
Paradise Boats, Inc., No. 93-2349CIVGRAHAM, 1994 WL 1720238, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 1994). 
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Two decisions, Amerigraphics, Inc. v. Mercury Casualty Co.
98
 and 
Continental Insurance Co. v. DNE Corp.,
99
 illustrate the courts’ 
inconsistent interpretations of this policy language. In 
Amerigraphics, the policyholder was a printing and graphics 
company.
100
 Following the 9/11 terrorist attack, business was poor.
101
 
Post-9/11, while business was poor, the company’s premises were 
flooded.
102
 The insurer refused to pay the policyholder anything for 
its business interruption claim under the theory that the policyholder 
was losing money at the time of the business interruption and would 
have continued to lose money even if its operations had not been 
interrupted.
103
 The policyholder contended it nonetheless was entitled 
to recover its continuing fixed costs without an offset for the 
projected negative net income.
104
 
The trial court agreed with the policyholder and the intermediate 
appellate court affirmed, stating: 
[U]nder the plain language of the policy, the business-income 
provision should be interpreted to mean that [the insurer] will 
pay an insured for any lost income and will pay an insured its 
continuing normal business expenses during the period of 
business suspension. To the extent there is no lost income (i.e., 
there is only a net loss), the amount paid under subpart (i) would 
be zero, but the insured would still be paid under subpart (ii) for 
its operating expenses . . . . [T]he policy does not use the words 
“plus,” “offset,” “subtract,” “minus,” or the like. It uses the word 
“and.” The plain meaning of “and” is consistent with [the 
policyholder’s] and the trial court’s interpretation.
105
 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Amerigraphics, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 307. 
 99. DNE, 834 S.W.2d at 930. 
 100. Amerigraphics, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 312. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 315. 
 104. Id. at 316. 
 105. Id. at 318–19. 
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Thus, the policyholder was allowed to recover its continuing fixed 
expenses even though it would have incurred a loss if its business 
operations had not been interrupted. 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee reached the opposite conclusion 
in DNE.
106
 In DNE, the policyholder made transmission and gear 
products for the automotive industry.
107
 It had been operating at a 
loss for some time prior to when its operations were interrupted due 
to a tornado.
108
 As was the case in Amerigraphics, the policyholder 
contended recovery of its continuing fixed expenses should not be 
offset by its projected net income loss.
109
 The insurer contended the 
policyholder should recover nothing because the policyholder’s 
projected net income loss exceeded the continuing fixed expenses.
110
 
The trial court ruled in favor of the insurer.
111
 The Supreme Court 
of Tennessee affirmed, stating: 
The purpose of business interruption insurance is to protect the 
insured against losses that occur when its operations are 
unexpectedly interrupted, and to place it in the position it would 
have occupied if the interruption had not occurred . . . . [T]he 
interpretation advocated by [the policyholder] (i.e., ignoring “net 
income” whenever there is a net loss) would put the insured, in 
all cases when there is a net loss, in a better economic position 
from having had its business interrupted than it would have 
occupied had there been no interruption of its business 
operations . . . . We therefore conclude that the amount of 
“business income” under the insurance policy provision involved 
in this case should be determined by adding the amount of “net 
income” and the amount of “continuing normal operating 
expenses.” Under this approach, if “net income” is a positive 
number (which will occur whenever there are net profits), the 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Cont’l Ins. Co. v. DNE Corp., 834 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1992). 
 107. Id. at 931. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 932. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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amount of “business income” will be the sum of two positive 
numbers, and the insured will be entitled to recover that amount. 
If, however, “net income” is a negative number (which will 
occur whenever there is a net loss), the amount of “business 
income” will be the amount of “continuing normal operating 
expenses” reduced by the amount of the net loss.
112
 
Thus, the court would not allow the policyholder to recover 
continuing fixed expenses if they exceeded the amount of the 
projected net income loss. 
The court’s decision in DNE raises the specter that, in a 
jurisdiction such as Tennessee, an insurer may be engaging in a form 
of fraud by selling business interruption insurance to a policyholder 
whose business is operating at a loss.
113
 If the policy does not cover 
the continuing operating expenses of a business that is losing money 
when its operations are interrupted by a covered loss, then what value 
does the policyholder receive in exchange for the premium it pays for 
business interruption coverage? 
Aside from raising that intriguing question, the answer to which is 
beyond the scope of this Article, the DNE and Amerigraphics 
decisions highlight that the courts have reached inconsistent, and in 
some instances, polar opposite conclusions when attempting to 
interpret and apply the existing valuation language contained in 
business interruption policies. 
                                                                                                                 
 112. DNE, 834 S.W.2d at 934 (citations omitted). 
 113. Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524, 526 (Ala. 1997) (affirming damages awarded to 
plaintiff by jury holding that insurer engaged in intentional and reckless fraud by selling a worthless 
Medicare supplement insurance policy); Glazewski v. Coronet Ins. Co., 483 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (Ill. 
1985) (“We are of the opinion that the issuance of coverage by an insurance company in return for a 
premium is a tacit representation to the consumer that the coverage has value. Assuming for purposes of 
a motion to dismiss that plaintiffs’ allegations that the coverage has no value are true, we find that the 
insurance company defendants have made a false representation as to the value of the coverage by 
issuing it without disclosing that it had no value.”). 
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D.   Courts’ Confusion Regarding the Evidentiary Standard Under 
Which Business Interruption Losses Must be Proven 
Although the courts do not agree on how the existing standard 
valuation language should be interpreted or applied to business 
interruption losses, there is one consistency in the case law—the 
courts consistently are confused regarding the evidentiary standard to 
apply to business interruption claims.
114
 This is not surprising 
because a business interruption loss valuation is an inherently 
speculative exercise under the existing policy language. Thus, what 
should the burden of proof be regarding a speculative damages 
claim? 
Consider again the applicable language found in many business 
interruption policies today: 
In determining the amount of gross earnings covered hereunder 
for the purposes of ascertaining the amount of loss sustained, due 
consideration shall be given to the experience of the business 
before the date of the damage or destruction and to the probable 
experience thereafter had no loss occurred.
115
 
Under this language, the policyholder is asked to prove what the 
“probable” experience would have been if the loss had not 
occurred.
116
 In short, the policyholder must prove what its 
hypothetical earnings and expenses would have been. 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Polytech, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 21 F.3d 271, 276 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding business 
interruption losses must be proven “with reasonable certainty” and “without resorting to speculation”); 
E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068, 1074 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding 
policyholder has burden of providing non-speculative evidence regarding amount of its loss); 
Dictiomatic, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 958 F. Supp. 594, 603 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (holding policyholder 
that introduced “contradictory projections” regarding its alleged business interruption loss failed to meet 
its burden of proof); Howard Stores Corp. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 441 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1981) (finding policyholder failed to meet its burden of proving its loss was due to business interruption 
rather than other causes). 
 115. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005) (emphasis 
added). See also cases cited supra notes 44, 67. 
 116. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314. 
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Some commentators have described the inherently speculative 
nature of business interruption loss valuations as follows: 
Calculating lost income is considerably more conceptual and 
theoretical than evaluating and determining replacement or 
repair of damaged property. Business interruption evaluation 
often involves theoretical calculations that require significant 
and difficult projections such as a projection of the period of 
interruption and of the business that would have been conducted 
during the period of interruption. Adjustment of a business 
interruption loss therefore often requires the parties to apply the 
terms of the policy against an estimate of what the business 
would have earned had the loss not occurred. The exercise is 
challenging because it requires “proof” of something which 
never occurred but what should have occurred but for an 
interrupting event.
117
 
. . . . 
As John F. Kennedy said, “I dream of things that never were,” 
[thus, we] similarly acknowledge that calculating lost income is, 
by definition, speculative.
118
 
Not surprisingly, the fact that business interruption loss valuations 
are inherently speculative under the existing policy language has 
caused the courts some consternation when trying to apply traditional 
evidentiary standards of proof to such claims.
119
 On the one hand, it 
is hornbook law that damages should be proven to a “reasonable 
degree of certainty.”120 Yet, how does one prove to a reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Lawrence T. Bowman & Kendall K. Hayden, A Practical Guide to Evaluating Contingent 
Business Interruption Losses, in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, 49, 50 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
 118. Id. at 66 (citing Jess B. Millikan, Practice Tips: Time Element Losses During Catastrophes, 31 
BRIEF 52 (2002)). 
 119. See, e.g., Polytech, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 21 F.3d 271 (8th Cir. 1994); E. Associated 
Coal Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 632 F.2d 1068 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 120. Harbor House Condo. Ass’n v. Mass. Bay Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1990); ATACS 
Corp. v. Trans World Commc’ns, 155 F.3d 659, 669 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A]n injured party need only 
prove damages with reasonable certainty.”). See also LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON 
INSURANCE § 175:64 (3d ed. 2005) (“But there can be no recovery where the loss cannot be determined 
within reasonable certainty.”). 
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degree of certainty something that is an inherently speculative 
valuation regarding the earnings and expenses a policyholder would 
have had in the hypothetical world in which the loss did not occur? 
Several courts’ decisions seem to suggest that, at least based upon the 
facts presented in the cases at issue, policyholders may not be able to 
do so.
121
 
The Third Circuit’s opinion in Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
122
 is illustrative of this point. In 
Eastern, the policyholder was a coal mine operator.
123
 The 
policyholder produced different classifications of coal such as low 
sulphur and high sulphur coal that are used in different 
manufacturing processes.
124
 The price for the coal depended upon its 
sulphur content, which was impacted by a treatment done to the coal 
known as “washing.”125 A fire caused the interruption of coal 
production for a year.
126
 When valuing the policyholder’s business 
interruption loss, the parties disputed what percent of the lost coal 
sales would have been high sulphur versus low sulphur coal.
127
 
At trial, the jury found in favor of the policyholder.
128
 The trial 
court nonetheless entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in 
favor of the insurer because it thought the evidence supporting the 
policyholder’s claim was too “speculative.”129 The Third Circuit 
agreed.
130
 In explaining its holding, the Third Circuit stated: 
[W]e hold that the evidence of the sulphur content of coal in the 
mine alone was insufficient for the jury to determine the sulphur 
content at the time of delivery. Without evidence of the 
effectiveness of the washing process, the jury could only 
speculate concerning the sulphur content at the time of delivery. 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See, e.g., Polytech, 21 F.3d 271; E. Associated Coal Corp., 632 F.2d 1068. 
 122. E. Associated Coal Corp., 632 F.2d 1068. 
 123. Id. at 1070. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 1073. 
 126. Id. at 1071. 
 127. Id. at 1071–72. 
 128. E. Associated Coal Corp., 632 F.2d at 1072. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1074. 
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There is no evidence from which the jury could infer the 
effectiveness of washing. It was [the policyholder’s] burden to 
provide evidence from which its claim can be established.
131
 
In short, the court required the policyholder to prove to a reasonable 
certainty what apparently could not be proven—what the sulfur 
content in the coal that would have been mined, treated, and sold 
would have been if the fire had not occurred.
132
 
Similarly, in Polytech, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co.,
133
 an 
explosion and fire caused an interruption in the policyholder’s 
plexiglass manufacturing business.
134
 The parties disputed the 
amount of, and approach to proving, the business interruption loss.
135
 
On the morning the trial was scheduled to commence, the trial court 
entered summary judgment in favor of the policyholder.
136
 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for 
trial because it found there was “conflicting evidence as to the 
existence of future earnings”137 Notably, in remanding the case, the 
court announced the following evidentiary standard for the 
policyholder to satisfy: “‘[T]o obtain a damage award for lost profits 
at trial, [the policyholder] must produce evidence that provides an 
adequate basis for estimating lost profits with reasonable certainty. 
Proof of actual facts which present a basis for a rational estimate of 
damages without resorting to speculation is required.’”138 In short, 
the policyholder was instructed on remand to prove, without 
speculative evidence, what would have happened had its business not 
been interrupted.
139
 
Cases such as the Eastern and Polytech decisions raise the 
following question: can a policyholder prove, to a “reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Polytech, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 21 F.3d 271, 272 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 272–73. 
 137. Id. at 277. 
 138. Id. at 276 (quoting Manor Square, Inc. v. Heartthrob of Kan. City, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 38, 44 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1993)). 
 139. Polytech, 21 F.3d at 276. 
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certainty,” the reality of a fictional situation? Of course they cannot. 
Nor, as is discussed below in Part IV.A.1., should they be expected 
or required to do so. 
III.   PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION RELEVANT 
TO VALUING BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES 
When courts are asked to interpret and apply policy language such 
as the loss valuation language quoted above, three well-established 
rules of policy interpretation are particularly relevant to the analysis: 
(1) contra proferentem, (2) the “reasonable expectations” doctrine, 
and (3) construction of the policy as a whole.
140
 
A.   The Doctrine of Contra Proferentem 
It is hornbook insurance law that because insurers are the drafters 
of policy language such as the loss valuation provisions contained in 
business interruption insurance policies,
141
 the doctrine of contra 
proferentem applies, which means any ambiguities in the policy 
language should be construed against the insurers and in favor of 
coverage.
142
 The test under many states’ laws for determining 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See discussion infra Part III.A–C. 
 141. See supra note 9. 
 142. Christopher C. French, The “Ensuing Loss” Clause in Insurance Policies: The Forgotten and 
Misunderstood Antidote to Anti-Concurrent Causation Exclusions, 13 NEV. L.J. 215, 223–24 (2012). 
See also Crane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 485 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Cal. 1971) (“Any ambiguity or 
uncertainty in an insurance policy is to be resolved against the insurer.”); Phillips Home Builders, Inc. v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 700 A.2d 127, 129 (Del. 1997) (“If there is an ambiguity, however, the contract 
language is ‘construed most strongly against the insurance company that drafted it.’”); Crawford v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 783 P.2d 900, 904 (Kan. 1989) (“Since an insurer prepares its own contracts, 
it has a duty to make the meaning clear, and if it fails to do so, the insurer, and not the insured, must 
suffer.”); RPM Pizza, Inc. v. Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 601 So.2d 1366, 1369 (La. 1992) (“[A]ny ambiguity 
must be construed against the insurance company and in favor of the reasonable construction that 
affords coverage.”); Am. Bumper and Mfg. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 550 N.W.2d 475, 480 (Mich. 
1996) (“[I]n construing insurance contracts, any ambiguities are strictly construed against the insurer to 
maximize coverage.”); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Flanagin, 210 A.2d 221, 226 (N.J. 1965) (“If the 
controlling language will support two meanings, one favorable to the insurer, and the other favorable to 
the insured, the interpretation sustaining coverage must be applied.”) (quoting Mazzilli v. Accident & 
Cas. Ins. Co, of Winterthur, Switz., 170 A.2d 800, 803–04 (N.J. 1961)); Gomolka v. State Auto Mut. 
Ins. Co., 436 N.E.2d 1347, 1348-49 (Ohio 1982) (“Policies of insurance, which are in language selected 
by the insurer and which are reasonably open to different interpretations, will be construed most 
favorably for the insured.”) (quoting Home Indem. Co. v. Village of Plymouth, 64 N.E.2d 248, 250 
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whether policy language is ambiguous is whether the provisions at 
issue are reasonably or fairly susceptible to different interpretations 
or meanings.
143
 If the policyholder and insurer both offer reasonable 
interpretations of the policy language, then the policy language is 
ambiguous and should be construed in favor of coverage.
144
 Where 
the controversy involves a phrase that the insurers have failed to 
define and has generated many lawsuits with varying results, 
common sense dictates that the policy language must be 
ambiguous.
145
 
                                                                                                                 
(Ohio 1945)); ELIZABETH K. AINSLIE ET AL., BUSINESS INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE GUIDE 
§ 2.02(1) (2013); BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE 
DISPUTES § 1.03(c), at 28–30 (9th ed. 1998); 2 ERIC M. HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, APPLEMAN ON 
INSURANCE § 6.1, at 132–33 (2d ed. 1996); 2 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
§ 16.06 (Supp. 1988); RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 120, § 22:14; JEFFREY W. STEMPEL 
INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS: LAW AND STRATEGY FOR INSURERS AND 
POLICYHOLDERS § 5.1, at 173 (1994); David B. Goodwin, Disputing Insurance Coverage Disputes, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 779, 795–96 (1991) (reviewing BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, 
HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES (3d ed. 1990)). 
 143. HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 142, § 6.1, at 169 (insurer has burden of establishing that 
insurer’s interpretation is the only fair interpretation of contract); LONG, supra note 142, § 16.06, at 16–
32. See also New Castle Cnty. Del. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 243 F.3d 744, 750 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (“‘The settled test for ambiguity is whether the provisions in controversy are reasonably or 
fairly susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more different meanings.’”) (quoting 
New Castle Cnty. Del. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 174 F.3d 338, 344 (3d Cir. 1999)); 
Shepard v. Calfarm Life Ins. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 428, 432–33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding a policy 
provision is ambiguous when more than one construction exists and the burden of proving one 
reasonable construction falls to the insurer); High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 476 
(N.H. 1994) (“If the language of the policy reasonably may be interpreted more than one way and one 
interpretation favors coverage, an ambiguity exists in the policy that will be construed in favor of the 
insured and against the insurer.”); Salem Grp. v. Oliver, 607 A.2d 138, 139 (N.J. 1992) (“When a policy 
fairly supports an interpretation favorable to both the insured and the insurer, the policy should be 
interpreted in favor of the insured.”); Harris, Jolliff & Michel, Inc. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 255 
N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970) (finding that where insurer and insured each present reasonable 
interpretations of exclusion, exclusion is ambiguous and must be interpreted in favor of the insured); 
Bartlett v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 45, 47 (R.I. 1991) (noting ambiguity if clause has more than 
one reasonable meaning); Bonner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 841 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1992) (“The court must adopt the construction of an exclusionary clause urged by the insured as long as 
the construction is not unreasonable, even if the construction urged by the insurer appears to be more 
reasonable or a more accurate reflection of the parties’ intent.”). 
 144. Bonner, 841 S.W.2d at 506. 
 145. New Castle Cnty. Del., 243 F.3d at 756 (finding ambiguity where the contested phrase was not 
defined and had been interpreted differently by various courts); Sec. Ins. Co. v. Investors Diversified 
Ltd., 407 So. 2d 314, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“The insurance company contends that the 
language is not ambiguous, but we cannot agree and offer as proof of that pudding the fact that the 
Supreme Court of California and the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans have arrived at opposite conclusions 
from a study of essentially the same language.”); Crawford v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 783 P.2d 900, 
908 (Kan. 1989) (“[R]eported cases are in conflict, the trial judge and the Court of Appeals reached 
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Further, because insurers seek to invoke the valuation provisions 
as a way of limiting the amount of coverage to be provided for losses 
that are unquestionably insured, the language should be viewed as 
akin to an exclusion, which means: (1) it should be narrowly 
construed against the insurer, and (2) the insurer has the burden of 
proving its applicability.
146
 Indeed, numerous courts have held that 
exclusions will not be interpreted and applied in such a way as to 
swallow the basic coverages provided under a policy.
147
 So how does 
contra proferentem apply in the context of interpreting and applying 
the valuation provisions in business interruption insurance? As is 
discussed above and below in Part IV, an ambiguous insurance 
policy provision is one that has more than one reasonable meaning.
148
 
Thus, when one attempts to interpret and apply the valuation 
                                                                                                                 
different conclusions and the justices of this court [disagree] . . . . Under such circumstances, the clause 
is, by definition, ambiguous and must be interpreted in favor of the insured.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 311 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (“Since we assume that all 
courts adopt a reasonable construction, the conflict is of itself indicative that the word as so used is 
susceptible of at least two reasonable interpretations, one of which extends the coverage to the situation 
at hand.”); George H. Olmsted & Co. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 161 N.E. 276, 276 (Ohio 1928) (“Where 
the language of a clause used in an insurance contract is such that courts of numerous jurisdictions have 
found it necessary to construe it and in such construction have arrived at conflicting conclusions as to 
the correct meaning, intent and effect thereof, the question whether such clause is ambiguous ceases to 
be an open one.”); Cohen v. Erie Indem. Co., 432 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (“The mere fact 
that [courts differ on the construction of the provision] itself creates the inescapable conclusion that the 
provision in issue is susceptible to more than one interpretation.”). See generally Charles C. Marvel, 
Annotation, Division of Opinion Among Judges on Same Court or Among Other Courts or Jurisdictions 
Considering Same Question, as Evidence that Particular Clause of Insurance Policy is Ambiguous, 4 
A.L.R. 4TH 1253 (1981). 
 146. SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Minn. 1995) (insurer has burden to 
prove the applicability of an exclusion as an affirmative defense); Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Louis Marx & Co., 
415 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ohio 1980) (defense has burden of proving defense based upon exclusion); Brown 
v. Snohomish Cnty. Physicians Corp., 845 P.2d 334, 340 (Wash. 1993) (once insured has made a prima 
facie case that there is coverage, burden shifts to the insurer to prove an exclusionary provision applies). 
See also HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 142, § 6.1, at 139–42; RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 120, 
§ 22:31. 
 147. Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding 
policy excluding acts explicitly covered in prior section of policy is construed against insurer); Alstrin v. 
St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 390 (D. Del. 2002) (construing ambiguities against 
insurer in order to reduce the insurer’s incentive to draft policy language where certain provisions 
purport to give coverage while other clauses “take that very coverage away”); Titan Indem. Co. v. 
Newton, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1348 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (finding coverage even though “the limitations of 
[the] policy completely swallow up the insuring provisions”); Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375, 
1380 (Md. 1997) (finding that “[i]f the exclusion totally swallows the insuring provision,” then such 
provisions create the greatest form of ambiguity, and the insurer is obliged to provide coverage). 
 148. See supra note 143. 
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provisions of business interruption insurance—as evidenced by the 
fact no loss valuation formula is contained in the provisions, many of 
the terms are not defined, and the courts have struggled to even 
determine what evidence should be considered when valuing 
business interruption losses—it becomes apparent that the provisions 
are ambiguous when applied.
149
 Consequently, they should be 
construed against insurers.
150
 
B.   The “Reasonable Expectations” Doctrine 
Another staple of insurance law is that a policy should be 
interpreted in such a way as to fulfill the “reasonable expectations” of 
the policyholder.
151
 A seminal article regarding the “reasonable 
expectations” doctrine was written more than forty years ago by then 
Professor Robert Keeton.
152
 In his subsequent treatise, then Judge 
Keeton summarized the doctrine as follows: 
                                                                                                                 
 149. See infra Parts III, IV. 
 150. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text. 
 151. AINSLIE, supra note 142, § 2.02(1)(4); French, supra note 142, at 225–26; ROBERT E. KEETON & 
ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW § 6.3(a)(3), at 633–34 (1988); LONG, supra note 142, § 16.07, at 16-
43; OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 142, § 1.03(b)(2)(B), at 22–27 (identifying courts in thirty-eight 
jurisdictions that have expressed support for, or applied a form of, the reasonable expectations doctrine); 
RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 120, § 22.11; STEMPEL, supra note 142, § 11.1, at 312. See also AIU Ins. 
Co. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara Cnty., 799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990) (interpreting ambiguous 
coverage clauses of insurance policies broadly to protect the objectively reasonable expectations of the 
insured); Roland v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 462 S.E.2d 623, 625 (Ga. 1995) (“A contract of 
insurance should be strictly construed against the insurer and read in favor of coverage in accordance 
with the reasonable expectations of the insured.”); Corgatelli v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 533 
P.2d 737, 741 (Idaho 1975) (applying reasonable expectations doctrine notwithstanding conclusion that 
the provision was unambiguous); Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 671–73 (N.D. 
1977) (holding doctrine of reasonable expectations is properly invoked to discern intentions of parties 
and impose liability on insurer); A.B.C. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 661 A.2d 1187, 1190 (N.H. 
1995) (“‘[T]he policy language must be so clear as to create no ambiguity which might affect the 
insured’s reasonable expectations.’”) (quoting Cacavas v. Me. Bonding & Cas. Co., 512 A.2d 423, 425 
(N.H. 1986)); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Century Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 824 P.2d 302, 308 (N.M. 1992) (stating 
that courts will give effect to policyholder’s reasonable expectations in construing policy language); 
Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488, 495–96 (W. Va. 1987) (stating that 
courts will apply reasonable expectations doctrine to construe the policy in a manner that a reasonable 
person standing in the shoes of the insured would expect the language to mean, “even though 
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations”) (quoting Robert 
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970)). 
 152. Robert Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
961, 966–77 (1970). 
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In general, courts will protect the reasonable expectations of 
applicants, insureds, and intended beneficiaries regarding the 
coverage afforded by insurance contracts even though a careful 
examination of the policy provisions indicates that such 
expectations are contrary to the expressed intention of the 
insurer.
153
 
As another commentator more recently stated, “In other words, even 
when the policy language unambiguously precludes coverage, under 
certain circumstances, courts will hold that coverage exists.”154 
Stated differently, the policyholder should receive in coverage 
what it objectively can reasonably expect to receive even if the 
insurer can point to some policy language that supports the insurer’s 
position that the claim at issue should not be covered or coverage 
should be limited.
155
 Thus, for example, a policyholder who buys 
                                                                                                                 
 153. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 151, § 6.3(a)(3), at 633. For commentary regarding the 
reasonable expectations doctrine, see Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made 
Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981); Roger 
C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 823 (1990) (providing a detailed historical account of the doctrine and asserting that the doctrine 
is principled and can be applied within justifiable guidelines); Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Contract, 
and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 21 (1998) (discussing the doctrine 
as conceptualized by Keeton); William A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking a Principled 
Application, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 267, 287–96 (1986) (formulating standards for applying the doctrine); 
Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REV. 323, 392 (1986) (arguing 
for refinements to the doctrine in response to the fading appeal that the doctrine holds for courts and 
commentators and contending that courts should “discard their unfortunate tendency to speak the 
platitudes of reasonable expectations without undertaking a careful and systematic analysis”); Daniel 
Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1389, 1395 (2007) (criticizing the reasonable expectations doctrine and arguing that the 
case law endorsing the doctrine is “confused and inconsistent”). While there is relatively broad 
acceptance of the doctrine, judicial interpretation and application of the doctrine is variable. See Jeffrey 
W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the 
Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 191 (1998) (describing judicial 
approaches and noting both liberal and narrow approaches among the numerous states that have adopted 
the doctrine); Peter Nash Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of 
Reasonable Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729 (2000) (exploring judicial responses and proposing a 
middle ground approach). 
 154. Francis J. Mootz, III, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination Claims, 52 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 1, 22, (1997). 
 155. The reasonable expectations doctrine is rooted in the fact that insurance policies generally are 
contracts of adhesion drafted by insurers and offered to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. See, 
e.g., KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 151, at 967; Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some 
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629, 632 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, 
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business interruption insurance to protect its earnings stream against 
business interruptions caused by catastrophic perils, such as 
hurricanes and tornadoes, reasonably can expect that it will be 
reimbursed for its lost business earnings when a hurricane or tornado 
interrupts its business. 
So what does this mean in the context of valuing business 
interruption loss claims? As is discussed below in Part IV, because 
the valuation provisions are, at best, ambiguous, one arguably does 
not even need to apply the reasonable expectations doctrine. The 
ambiguities in the language should be construed in favor of the 
policyholder.
156
 Nonetheless, even if the provisions were somehow 
viewed as unambiguous, a policyholder who buys business 
interruption insurance reasonably can expect to receive from its 
insurer, for the period of interruption, the business earnings it had 
been receiving prior to the catastrophe. In other words, courts should 
not permit insurers to accept premiums for business interruption 
insurance, but then, when a claim is presented, pay the policyholder 
nothing or only a fraction of its business interruption loss. To do so 
would render the coverage provided to the business owner under the 
policy illusory, which is impermissible.
157
 
                                                                                                                 
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1226 (1983); Schwarcz, 
supra note 153, at 1401–02; Peter Nash Swisher, Symposium Introduction, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 5 (1998) 
(introducing the Association of American Law Schools program entitled “The Insurance Law Doctrine 
of Reasonable Expectations After Three Decades”). 
 156. Consol. Cos. v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 06-4700, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8542, at *25 (E.D. La. 
Jan. 23, 2009) (citing La. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 616 So. 2d 
1250, 1252 (La. 1993)). 
 157. See supra note 147. See also Bowersox Truck Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Harco Nat’l Ins. Co., 209 
F.3d 273, 277–78 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting insurer’s interpretation of policy’s two-year limitation period 
where interpretation would have rendered coverage illusory); Harris v. Gulf Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 
1220, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (rejecting insurer’s interpretation of exclusion in policy because it “would 
render the coverage provided by the policy illusory”); Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 
2d 376, 398 (D. Del. 2002) (rejecting a D&O insurer’s interpretation of the policy’s deliberate fraud 
exclusion where, if applied, “there would be little or nothing left to that coverage” because “[n]o insured 
would expect such limited coverage from a policy that purports to cover all types of securities fraud 
claims”); Atofina Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 185 S.W.3d 440, 444–45 (Tex. 2005) 
(rejecting insurer’s interpretation of additional insured endorsement because it “would render coverage 
under the endorsement largely illusory”). 
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C.   Construction of the Policy as a Whole 
Another policy interpretation principle applicable to the valuation 
of business interruption losses “provides that, if possible, the policy 
should be interpreted in a way that reconciles [the] various provisions 
[of the policy] and attempts to give effect to all of [the provisions]” 
while keeping the general purpose of the insurance in mind.
158
 In the 
context of business interruption insurance, this means that the courts 
should interpret the various components of the valuation provisions 
in light of the purpose of business interruption insurance. As is 
discussed above, the basic purpose of business interruption insurance 
is to protect the policyholder from lost earnings during periods of 
interruption.
159
 If that purpose is not fulfilled when the policy 
language at issue is interpreted and applied, then the insurance 
coverage purchased may impermissibly become illusory.
160
 
IV.   HOW BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES SHOULD BE VALUED 
In this part of the Article, the problems with the courts’ various 
approaches to interpreting and applying the policy language 
regarding the valuation of business interruption losses are discussed. 
Then, an interpretation regarding the existing valuation language 
under the rules of policy interpretation is offered. Finally, a proposal 
                                                                                                                 
 158. French, supra note 142, at 227. See also O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(4) (West 2010) (contracts should be 
interpreted as a whole); Rothenberg v. Lincoln Farm Camp, Inc., 755 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(“[A]n interpretation that gives a reasonable and effective meaning to all the terms of a contract is 
generally preferred to one that leaves a part unreasonable or of no effect[.]”); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 286 Cal. Rptr. 146, 155–56 (Ct. App. 1991) (“In short, an insurance contract is to be 
construed in a manner which gives meaning to all its provisions in a natural, reasonable, and practical 
manner, having reference to the risk and subject matter and to the purposes of the entire contract.”) 
(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crane 217 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1132 (Ct. App. 1990)); Barrett 
v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 220 Cal. Rptr. 135, 137 (Ct. App. 1985) (“The [insurance contract] is to be 
construed in a manner which gives a reasonable meaning to all its provision in a natural, reasonable and 
praticalmanner, [sic] having reference to the risk and subject matter and to the purposes of the entire 
contract.”) (quoting Home Indem. Co. v. Leo L. Davis, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 3d 863, 869 (Ct. App. 1978)); 
Weiss v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 319 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ill. 1974) (provisions in an insurance policy 
should be interpreted in context of entire policy); Welborn v. Ill. Nat. Cas. Co., 106 N.E.2d 142, 143 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1952) (“[T]he court should determine the intention from the whole agreement, and endeavor to 
give a meaning to all provisions, so far as possible, which will render them consistent and operative.”). 
 159. See supra note 6. 
 160. See supra notes 147, 157. See also discussion infra Part IV. 
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regarding how business interruption losses should be valued in the 
future is presented. 
A.   The Problems with the Existing Framework 
There are numerous problems with the existing valuation language 
in business interruption policies. Consequently, the courts’ attempts 
to apply this language has resulted in a body of case law that is 
inconsistent, unpredictable, and leads to the inefficient resolution of 
business interruption claims. 
1.   Business Interruption Loss Valuations are Inherently 
Speculative so They Cannot be Proven with “Reasonable 
Certainty” 
As an initial matter, because valuing a business interruption loss is 
an inherently speculative exercise under the existing policy language, 
the courts should not be requiring policyholders to prove to a 
reasonable degree of certainty the amount the policyholder would 
have earned during the period of interruption.
161
 To do so imposes an 
arguably insurmountable evidentiary burden on the policyholder 
under the current valuation language.
162
 A business interruption loss 
calculation under the existing policy language is a hypothetical 
exercise—a projection. One cannot prove what would have happened 
with “reasonable certainty” if a business’s operation had not been 
interrupted. No one knows with reasonable, or unreasonable, 
certainty what would have happened. If people could predict the 
future with reasonable certainty, many accidents and catastrophes 
could and would be avoided. 
Indeed, the notion that a policyholder should be able to appear in 
court and demonstrate exactly how many orders it would have 
received if its business had been operational is not grounded in 
reality. When a business is shut down, the orders stop coming as soon 
as customers learn of the interruption. Customers do not call the 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See supra Part II.D. 
 162. Id. 
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policyholder and say, “if your business were still operating, I would 
have ordered X widgets.” The phones simply stop ringing. The 
customers take their business elsewhere. 
Consequently, policyholders typically do not have documentation 
of “lost” orders. Nor can or would most policyholders present 
customers at trial who would testify that they would have ordered a 
specific amount of product or services if the business had been 
operational. Customers do not keep track of orders they do not place. 
Thus, requiring policyholders to prove such matters to a “reasonable 
degree of certainty” is simply inconsistent with the way the business 
world works and, in many instances, is impossible. 
Moreover, it would be bad business for a policyholder to even 
attempt to do so. How many customers voluntarily will want to 
interrupt their professional and personal lives to go to court and 
testify in an insurance dispute that does not even involve them? 
Because very few people are interested in putting aside their personal 
and professional obligations in order to subject themselves to cross 
examination, it would be bad business for a policyholder to even ask 
its customers to do so. So what then? Should the policyholder 
subpoena its uncooperative customers to testify? Doing so may 
provide the policyholder with a pyrrhic victory
163
 of winning the 
lawsuit against its insurer but losing its customers. 
Putting aside the problems such an evidentiary standard presents 
for the policyholder, how should a jury even attempt to apply a 
“reasonable degree of certainty” standard to what is indisputably a 
hypothetical situation? Indeed, in other contexts where the damages 
at issue are inherently speculative, such as the valuation of lost 
goodwill, some courts use a relaxed evidentiary standard of proof 
where only the fact of damages, but not the amount, must be proven 
to a reasonable degree of certainty.
164
 For all of these reasons, courts 
                                                                                                                 
 163. See generally PLUTARCH, Life of Pyrrhus, in IX PLUTARCH’S LIVES 363 (Bernadotte Perrin 
trans. 1920). The phrase is named after King Pyrrhus of Epirus, whose army suffered irreplaceable 
casualties in defeating the Romans at Heraclea in 280 BC and Asculum in 279 BC during the Pyrrhic 
War. Id. 
 164. Although damages of lost goodwill technically must be proven to a reasonable degree of 
certainty, “‘the doctrine respecting the matter of certainty, properly applied, is concerned more with the 
fact of damage than with the extent or amount of damage.’” Lewis River Golf, Inc. v. O.M. Scott & 
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should not require policyholders to prove with “reasonable certainty” 
what their earnings and costs would have been in the fictional, 
hypothetical world in which the business interruption did not occur. 
Instead, as is discussed below in Part IV.C., the loss calculation 
should be done under fixed formulas that do not require the parties, 
court, or jury to conduct a “what if” analysis. 
2.   Using Only the Policyholder’s Historical Financial 
Information to Value Business Interruption Losses Ignores Some 
of the Valuation Policy Language 
In addition, the line of cases, with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Finger Furniture
165
 being the leading example, in which the courts 
only allow the policyholder’s historical financial information to be 
considered when business interruption losses are calculated, is based 
upon a selective reading of the valuation language in business 
interruption policies.
166
 The reasoning of the courts in these cases is 
that, “[t]he strongest and most reliable evidence of what a business 
would have done had the catastrophe not occurred is what it had been 
doing in the period just before the interruption.”167 Agreed, but the 
policy language does not say that. 
The valuation provisions provide that “due consideration shall be 
given to the experience of the business before the date of the damage 
or destruction and to the probable experience thereafter had no loss 
occurred.”168 Why would insurers include the italicized language if 
they really meant that only the experience of the policyholder before 
the catastrophe should be used to value the loss? If that is what the 
insurers intended, then it would have been simple enough for the 
policies to state, “when valuing the loss, only the historical 
performance of the policyholder shall be considered.” 
                                                                                                                 
Sons, 845 P.2d 987, 990 (Wash. 1993) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gaasland Co., Inc. v. Hyak Lumber 
& Millwork, Inc. 257 P.2d 784, 788 (Wash. 1953)). Damages for lost good will are “not subject to proof 
of mathematical certainty,” and consequently, they only have to be proven “‘with whatever definiteness 
and accuracy the facts permit, but no more.’” Id. (quoting Official UCC Comment, § 1–106). 
 165. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co, 404 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 166. See supra Part II.A. 
 167. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314. 
 168. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit has interpreted the existing policy 
language to mean only the historical performance of the policyholder 
shall be considered.
169
 Under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, the 
“probable experience had no loss occurred” language is superfluous 
or, at best, redundant.
170
 Thus, by essentially overriding that policy 
language, the Fifth Circuit has violated one of the bedrock principles 
of insurance policy interpretation—that all provisions in the policy 
should be given effect and construed harmoniously if possible with 
the purpose of the insurance in mind.
171
 Further, and worse, by 
construing the language against policyholders in situations where the 
post-catastrophe economic conditions are favorable to the 
policyholder, the Fifth Circuit also has violated the fundamental 
doctrine of policy interpretation, contra proferentem, which dictates 
that ambiguities in policy language shall be construed in favor of 
policyholders.
172
 
With that said, by rendering the “probable experience had no loss 
occurred” language essentially meaningless, the Fifth Circuit has 
simplified the loss valuation analysis because it eliminated one of the 
issues most hotly contested—what impact the post-catastrophe 
economic conditions would have had on the policyholder’s business 
if the policyholder’s business had not been interrupted.173 The post-
catastrophe economic conditions for a policyholder can be either 
greatly enhanced or reduced depending upon the nature of the 
policyholder’s business. For example, after Hurricane Katrina, there 
was little demand for restaurants on Bourbon Street in New Orleans 
because tourists stopped going to New Orleans until the area had 
recovered.
174
 Thus, if one were to consider the post-catastrophe 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 172. See discussions supra Part III.A and infra Part IV.B. 
 173. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314. 
 174. See, e.g., Russell McCulley, Will Bourbon Street Bring the Tourists Back to New Orleans?, TIME 
(Aug. 25, 2006), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1334012,00.html (“Though the areas 
of most interest to visitors got through Katrina pretty much intact, the haunting images (including 
tourists trapped in hotels) and constant media attention left over from Katrina has kept the bulk of 
sightseers from returning.”); Kim Severson, New Orleans Watch: Restaurant Reopenings, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 18, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/18/travel/18webfood.html (“Without tourists, New 
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economic conditions for restaurants in New Orleans when valuing his 
business interruption losses, then such restaurants likely would have 
had little, if any, business interruption losses because there would not 
have been many customers patronizing the restaurants even if the 
restaurants had been operational. 
On the other hand, as evidenced by the case law discussed in Part 
II.B., there was great demand for housing in the New Orleans area 
after Hurricane Katrina.
175
 Consequently, the rental value of 
apartments increased post-catastrophe.
176
 Thus, if a policyholder 
were able to use the higher rental rates when valuing its business 
interruption loss, then its recovery for its business interruption loss 
would be higher than it would have been if the policyholder’s 
business had not been interrupted.
177
 
In addition, by eliminating consideration of the post-catastrophe 
economic conditions, the Fifth Circuit also effectively eliminated the 
need for expert witnesses to opine regarding the impact the state of 
the economy would have had on the policyholder’s business during 
the period of interruption.
178
 Indeed, since the 2008 financial 
meltdown, it has been common for insurers to contend policyholders 
that suffered a business interruption in the past few years did not 
actually suffer a loss due to the interruption because they would have 
been operating at a loss even if their businesses had not been 
interrupted.
179
 Thus, by limiting the relevant evidence allowed to 
value business interruption losses to the pre-loss time period, the 
state of the economy during the period of interruption becomes 
irrelevant under the Fifth Circuit’s approach. 
In short, although the Fifth Circuit should be lauded for attempting 
to simplify business interruption loss calculations, the way the Fifth 
                                                                                                                 
Orleans is losing more than $15 million a day in direct revenue, according to the governor’s office.”). 
 175. See supra note 67. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314. 
 179. See, e.g., Penford Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No. 09-CV-13-LRR, 2010 
WL 2509985, at *11 (N.D. Iowa June 17, 2010) (allowing insurers’ expert to offer an opinion regarding 
the effect the recession would have had on the policyholder’s business during the period of interruption). 
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Circuit has done so is inconsistent with the existing valuation policy 
language and the rules of policy interpretation. 
3.   Consideration of the Post-Catastrophe Economic Conditions 
Can Lead to Unfair Results and Factual Disputes That Must be 
Tried 
Also, allowing the post-loss economic conditions to be considered 
when valuing business interruption losses often creates: (1) windfall 
gains or unfair losses for the policyholder and (2) factual disputes 
because the parties often do not agree on the state of the economy or 
its impact on the policyholder’s business. 
If the result in a case is that the policyholder obtains a windfall 
gain or an unfair loss, then the legal system has failed in that case. As 
is discussed above, the purpose of business interruption insurance is 
to place the policyholder in the same position it would have been if 
its business had not been interrupted.
180
 Often times, however, the 
catastrophe that causes the business interruption changes the 
economy in the area of the catastrophe. Consequently, when the post-
catastrophe economic conditions are considered when calculating the 
policyholder’s business interruption loss, the policyholder may 
receive a windfall gain or an unfairly low loss valuation. 
Again, the New Orleans area following Hurricane Katrina is a 
prime example of this phenomenon. As previously noted, certain 
businesses, such as restaurants in the French Quarter, had very little 
business immediately following Hurricane Katrina because tourists 
stopped going to New Orleans.
181
 If the post-catastrophe economic 
conditions of New Orleans were considered in valuing restaurants’ 
business interruption losses after the hurricane passed, then they 
arguably had little or no losses because there was little or no demand 
for their services. It obviously would be unfair; however, if no 
business interruption loss payments were made to restaurants, 
because they clearly suffered massive losses due to Hurricane 
Katrina and they were not in the same position they would have been 
                                                                                                                 
 180. See supra note 6. 
 181. McCulley, supra note 174. 
2014] VALUING BUSINESS INTERRUPTION INSURANCE LOSS 503 
had Hurricane Katrina missed New Orleans. Thus, by considering the 
post-catastrophe economic conditions in that situation, the purpose of 
business interruption insurance would not be fulfilled. 
Conversely, the demand in the housing market in southern 
Louisiana increased after Hurricane Katrina.
182
 Thus, if a landlord’s 
business interruption losses following Hurricane Katrina were 
calculated using the post-Katrina rental values, then the landlord 
would receive a windfall gain because it would be placed in a better 
position than it would have been if no disaster had occurred and its 
business had not been interrupted. Indeed, the landlord would 
actually recover more for the period of interruption than it would 
have if no catastrophe had occurred. 
In addition, the factual disputes that arise when discussing the state 
of the post-catastrophe economy increases the chances a case will 
need to be tried,
183
 which places an unnecessary burden on the legal 
system. If a case has to be tried, it often means the outcome of the 
case is unpredictable because the parties would settle if they agreed 
on the outcome of the trial.
184
 As evidenced by the tapestry of 
inconsistent decisions discussed above in Part III.C., the outcomes of 
                                                                                                                 
 182. See, e.g., Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 973 So.2d 39, 57 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
 183. See, e.g., Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2308 (2010) (“[S]ummary judgment is 
appropriate where there ‘is no genuine issue as to any material fact’ and the moving party is ‘entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.’”) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)); Montgomery v. Barrow, 692 S.E.2d 
351, 353 (Ga. 2010) (“[T]he moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant 
judgment as a matter of law.”) (quoting Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 405 S.E.2d 474, 475 (Ga. 1991)); UT 
Med. Grp., Inc. v. Vogt, 235 S.W.3d 110, 119 (Tenn. 2007) (“[A] grant of summary judgment is 
appropriate only when (1) there is no genuine issue with regard to the material facts . . . , and (2) based 
on undisputed facts, ‘the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’”) (quoting TENN. R. 
CIV. P. 56.04)). 
 184. Cf. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to 
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60 (1996) (“The trials that occur, nonetheless, are primarily in cases in 
which the parties remain so far apart in their predictions of the decision on liability that they are willing 
to gamble on a jury’s notoriously unpredictable verdict.”); Peter Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for 
Settlement: Theory and Practice, J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (1991) (“[I]f . . . a plaintiff values a case too high 
or the defendant too low, settlement becomes difficult or impossible. At a minimum, this prolongs 
negotiations and unnecessarily consumes the parties’ and lawyers’ time and resources. At worst, matters 
that should have been settled proceed to trial, placing heavy burdens on the court system and the 
parties.”). 
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disputes regarding the valuation of business interruption losses under 
the existing case law are unpredictable.
185
 
Further, if a dispute arising from a contract (e.g., the insurance 
policy in this instance) has to be tried because the outcome of a trial 
is unpredictable, then one of the principal purposes of the contract 
also has failed. In addition to allowing the parties to memorialize 
their respective obligations, one of the principal purposes of contracts 
is to allow the parties to predict the results in the event of a breach by 
one of the parties.
186
 The necessity of a trial in a breach of contract 
dispute suggests that the predictive power of the contract, in this 
situation standard form policy language, is poor. 
In short, if a case has to be tried, then a greater burden is placed on 
the legal system because the case has to proceed through discovery, 
motions practice, and trial at great expense to the parties, courts, and 
jurors.
187
 Consequently, an interpretation of policy language that 
unnecessarily results in trials is costly to the legal system; and thus, 
the policy language or the interpretation of it, should be changed. 
B.   How Business Interruption Losses Should be Valued Under the 
Existing Policy Language 
 
                                                                                                                 
 185. See supra Part III.C. 
 186. MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ & DENISE RIEBE, CONTRACTS: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE 
CASEBOOK 5 (2009) (“[P]redictability promotes our free market economy by providing certainty for 
those involved in exchanging goods and services. If a merchant knows the legal consequences of her 
negotiating efforts or of the language she selects for her contracts, she can act accordingly. This 
predictability encourages people to enter into contracts, secure in the knowledge that those contracts will 
be enforced.”); Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 
94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2000) (“Long-term contracts raise a straightforward, but seemingly 
intractable problem: in the long term events are so hard to predict, that parties will not be able to allocate 
future obligations and payments in a way that maximizes the value of their contract.”). 
 187. See, e.g., Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 595 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Settlement 
agreements are to be encouraged because they promote the amicable resolution of disputes and lighten 
the increasing load of litigation faced by the federal courts. In addition to the conservation of judicial 
resources, the parties may also gain significantly from avoiding the costs and risks of a lengthy and 
complex trial.”) (citation omitted); Murchison v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1486 (11th 
Cir. 1994) (“We favor and encourage settlements in order to conserve judicial resources.”); Miller v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 155 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Mont. 2007) (“The declared public policy of this 
State is to encourage settlement and avoid unnecessary litigation . . . Settlement eliminates cost, stress, 
and waste of judicial resources.”). 
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1.   Applying the Rules of Policy Interpretation to Loss Valuation 
Language 
Under the existing rules of policy interpretation, the post-
catastrophe economic conditions should be considered when they 
favor the policyholder and ignored when they do not.
188
 Heads the 
policyholder wins, tails the insurer loses. How can that be right? 
Simply stated, the existing valuation language in business 
interruption policies is ambiguous. Thus, the language should be 
construed in favor of policyholders because insurers drafted it.
189
 
Consider again the relevant policy language that states how a 
business interruption loss should be calculated: 
[D]ue consideration shall be given to the experience of the 
business before the date of the damage or destruction and to the 
probable experience thereafter had no loss occurred.
190
 
No formula for calculating business interruption losses is set forth. 
Nor does the language state how one should determine what the 
policyholder’s “probable experience thereafter” would have been. 
Because the policy is silent on that issue, it is open to multiple 
interpretations. The policyholder may think its “probable” experience 
was going to be great because it had some great marketing ideas it 
had intended to implement. Should the policyholder’s marketing 
ideas be part of the loss equation? If so, who and how do you value 
them? The policyholder also may have been projecting growth in its 
industry or had a new product it planned to introduce that it expected 
would be well received by the market. Are these factors that should 
be part of the loss equation under this policy language? The policy 
does not address such matters. To the contrary, the language is 
intentionally open-ended and vague. 
Similarly, what does the phrase “had no loss occurred” mean? 
Does it mean: (1) had the catastrophe not occurred, (2) had the 
                                                                                                                 
 188. See supra Part III. 
 189. See supra Part III.A. 
 190. Finger Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co, 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005). 
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interruption of the policyholder’s business not occurred (but ignore 
whether the catastrophe changed the demand for the policyholder’s 
services or product), or (3) had the business interruption of the 
policyholder not occurred (but consider the impact the catastrophe 
had on the demand for the policyholder’s services or product)? It is 
unclear what the answers to these questions are under the existing 
policy language. Thus, because it is open to multiple reasonable 
interpretations, the language is ambiguous. 
These ambiguities are highlighted by the fact that courts have 
interpreted the same or similar business interruption loss valuation 
policy language and reached opposite conclusions regarding its 
meaning.
191
 On the one hand, the Fifth Circuit, for example, has 
interpreted the language to only allow for the consideration of the 
policyholder’s historical financial information when valuing the loss. 
192
 On the other hand, the state courts in Louisiana have interpreted 
the language to allow for the consideration of post-catastrophe 
economic conditions when valuing the loss.
193
 When two conflicting 
interpretations are both reasonable, the policy language must be 
ambiguous.
194
 
Hornbook insurance law dictates that ambiguous policy language 
should be construed in favor of the policyholder and against the 
insurer.
195
 That means the post-catastrophe economic conditions 
should be considered if they are favorable to the policyholder. If the 
post-catastrophe economic conditions are unfavorable to the 
policyholder, then they should not be considered. 
Further, the reasonable expectations doctrine also dictates that the 
post-catastrophe economic conditions should not be considered if the 
demand for the policyholder’s products or services was negatively 
impacted by the catastrophe.
196
 A policyholder does not reasonably 
                                                                                                                 
 191. See supra Parts II.A. and II.B. 
 192. Finger Furniture, 404 F.3d at 314. 
 193. See, e.g., Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 973 So. 2d 39, 57 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
 194. Bonner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 841 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992). 
 195. See supra Part III.A. 
 196. The reasonable expectations doctrine does not, however, dictate that the post-catastrophe 
economic conditions be considered if it would result in the policyholder receiving a windfall. See 
discussion supra Part III.B. In most contexts, policyholders will be hard pressed to credibly argue that 
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expect to find itself in a situation where its business has been 
interrupted but no “loss” has occurred for insurance purposes simply 
because the area near its business also was destroyed and thus there is 
little or no demand for the policyholder’s services or products post-
catastrophe. A policyholder reasonably expects that, after paying 
premiums for business interruption insurance,
197
 it will be paid 
something when its business is interrupted.
198
 If the policy language 
were construed in such a way that the post-catastrophe conditions 
would be considered in situations where there was little or no 
demand for the policyholder’s services or products due to the 
catastrophe (and thus, according to some insurers, no business 
interruption loss actually occurred), then the reasonable expectations 
of the policyholder would not be fulfilled. Indeed, no policyholder 
would reasonably expect that if a disaster destroys its business and 
the area near its business, then its insurance would become worthless. 
To the contrary, one of the primary reasons a policyholder purchases 
insurance such as business interruption insurance is to cover losses 
caused by disasters. 
Again, Hurricane Katrina is a good example to illustrate the point. 
Many of the policyholders’ restaurants were profitable before the 
hurricane.
199
 Then, there was an interruption in their businesses 
caused by the hurricane. In such circumstances, the policyholders 
reasonably expected they would be covered. Indeed, why would a 
policyholder whose business is located in a tourist town on the Gulf 
Coast, which is known for selling a drink called “the Hurricane,”200 
buy business interruption insurance if the insurance would not cover 
                                                                                                                 
they reasonably expected their business interruption insurance would provide recoveries greater than 
their historical earnings simply because a disaster occurs. Id. 
 197. Insurers, of course, make money by collecting more in premiums than they pay in claims and by 
investing the premiums until claims are paid. Eliot Martin Blake, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the 
Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 422–23 (1988) 
(“Insurers do not simply hang onto premiums, of course; they invest them for the time period between 
payment of premiums and payment of losses. . . . The role of investment income in the [insurance] 
industry is particularly important. Studies have concluded that investment income allows the industry to 
remain profitable as a whole even with significant negative underwriting losses.”). 
 198. See supra Part III.B. 
 199. See McCulley, supra note 174. 
 200. Keith I. Marszalek, Home of the “Hurricane” Pat O’Brien’s Turns 75 This Week, NOLA.COM 
(Nov. 30, 2008, 4:47 PM), http://blog.nola.com/anguslind/2008/11/pat_os_turns_75_this_week.html. 
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the loss of earnings caused by hurricanes that prevent tourists from 
going to the area? 
Similarly, the policy interpretation rule which provides that all of 
the provisions of a policy should be interpreted in a harmonious way 
that gives effect to the primary purpose of the insurance also dictates 
a result favorable to policyholders.
201
 The purpose of business 
interruption insurance is to transfer the risk of a loss of earnings due 
to business interruptions from the policyholder to the insurer.
202
 
Indeed, business interruption insurance’s primary purpose is to 
maintain the policyholder’s revenue stream during periods of 
interruption such that the policyholder will be returned to the same 
position it would have been had no business interruption occurred.
203
 
Thus, with these primary purposes of the insurance in mind, the 
valuation language should be interpreted in a way that ensures the 
policyholder will be made whole, which means the post-catastrophe 
economic conditions should not be considered if doing so would 
result in the policyholder effectively becoming uninsured for its loss 
of earnings following a catastrophe. 
2.   Analyzing the Loss Valuation Policy Language as a “Defective 
Product” 
In recent years, some scholars have advanced the theory that 
because policies are non-negotiated contracts of adhesion with 
standardized language drafted by insurers and are sold on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis, policies should be viewed as akin to products or 
“things” rather than simply contracts.204 This theory is further 
supported by the fact that policyholders often do not receive a copy 
of the policy itself until many months after it was purchased and they 
rarely read the many pages and terms of the policy when it finally is 
received.
205
 Consequently, most policyholders are not even aware of 
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what the specific language is in the policies.
206
 Even policyholders 
who attempt to review the pages and pages of terms and conditions 
set forth in the policy likely do not understand them due to the length 
and complexity of the language used.
207
 
Further, the insurance industry routinely refers to insurance 
policies as “products” that are researched, designed, marketed, and 
sold like manufactured goods.
208
 Similarly, the purchasers of 
insurance also consider insurance a “good” and brand loyalty for 
insurance products is very high.
209
 
When a policy is viewed as a product, the “reasonable 
expectations” doctrine and contra proferentem can be understood as 
judicially created contractual interpretation tools that courts apply in 
order to attempt to ensure that policyholders actually receive the 
product they thought they were purchasing.
210
 Instead of applying 
those interpretive tools to what can be viewed as a contract in name 
only, policies instead can be viewed as products. As a product, the 
question to be answered is whether the product that was sold is 
defective because it fails to perform as reasonably expected by the 
purchaser of the product—the policyholder. Of course, if a product is 
defective, then the seller of the product—the insurer—is responsible 
for any harm or damage caused by the product.
211
 
In the business interruption context, when a policyholder 
purchases a business interruption policy it reasonably expects to be 
paid the full amount of its loss less the deductible in the event that its 
business is interrupted. If the loss valuation language allows the 
insurer to pay nothing or less than the full amount of the loss in the 
event of a business interruption, then the policy is defective from the 
policyholder’s perspective. Consequently, the policyholder is injured 
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by the defective product in so far as it suffers an uncompensated loss 
and cannot retroactively buy an insurance policy to cover the 
unreimbursed portion of the loss. Under strict liability principles 
applicable to injuries caused by defective products, the seller of the 
defective product—the insurer—is liable for the injuries caused by its 
product.
212
 Thus, the insurer would be liable to the policyholder, 
under a products liability theory, for the amount of the policyholder’s 
loss that the policy does not cover. 
Does such an approach lead to a different result than when the 
reasonable expectations doctrine and contra proferentem are applied 
to the loss valuation language? No. Under both approaches, the 
insurer is legally responsible for ensuring that the product it sells—
the policy—fulfills the reasonable expectations of the purchaser of 
the product regarding the performance of the product. Considering 
policies as products, instead of contracts, however, is another way of 
analyzing the issue that confirms accuracy of the result under the 
traditional rules of policy interpretation. 
C.   Proposed Loss Valuation Formulas That are Based Upon the 
Original Purpose of Business Interruption Insurance and Which 
Provide Consistent, Predictable Results and the Efficient Resolution 
of Claims 
In this part, two proposed formulas for calculating business 
interruption losses are set forth and the public policy considerations 
associated with the payment of business interruption losses are 
analyzed. These proposals initially are intended for insurers, the 
drafters of policy language, because redrafting the policy language to 
incorporate either one of the proposals should eliminate many, if not 
all, of the disputes addressed in this Article that exist under the 
current policy language.
213
 If insurers fail to adopt one of the 
proposals, however, then courts and legislatures should act to ensure 
that the way business interruption losses are calculated changes. 
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1.   A Stated Daily Loss Value Set Forth in the Policy or Only the 
Policyholder’s Prior Three Years of Historical Earnings and 
Expenses Should be Used When Valuing Business Interruption 
Losses 
Simply stated, to eliminate the problems with the existing policy 
language discussed in this Article, either a stated daily loss value or 
only the prior three years of the policyholder’s historical earnings and 
cost information should be used to calculate business interruption 
losses. More specifically, the policies should contain a stated daily 
loss value for business interruption losses, just as the original “use 
and occupancy” policies did for lost rents.214 A daily loss value is the 
amount of loss a business suffers each day its business’s operations 
are suspended.
215
 During the annual policy renewal process, a 
policyholder provides a business interruption loss projection to the 
insurer’s underwriters that is based upon the policyholder’s current 
budget, revenue, and cost data that the insurer then uses to: (1) 
evaluate the insured risk, (2) calculate a daily loss value, and (3) in 
part, establish the amount of the premium.
216
 These same daily loss 
value figures could and should be used to calculate the loss in the 
event of a business interruption. Indeed, under disability insurance, 
which is analogous to business interruption insurance in that it 
insures a person for the income the person loses during time periods 
when the person is unable to work due to injury or illness, the 
amounts to be paid to the policyholder in the event of a disability are 
expressly stated in the policy and usually are a percentage of the 
policyholder’s income.217 
Using a stated daily loss value or a three-year time period of 
historical earnings and costs would eliminate arguments about 
whether earnings and costs were trending up or down before the 
business interruption or whether the policyholder’s recent results 
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were anomalous.
218
 Using a stated daily loss value or a three-year 
time period of historical financial results also would account for the 
state of the economy without the necessity of speculating about what 
the future would have held. As the Fifth Circuit has stated, “the 
strongest and most reliable evidence of what a business would have 
done had the catastrophe not occurred is what it had been doing in 
the period just before the interruption.”219 The loss valuation policy 
language should be changed to reflect that reality. 
The cost savings for the legal system should be significant under 
either of these proposals. Under these proposals, the parties would 
not need to hire experts to debate the state of the economy. Nor 
would they need to hire experts to opine on the industry trends for the 
policyholder’s business. Instead, the loss calculation would be a 
simple mathematical calculation in which the number of days the 
business was interrupted is multiplied by either the daily loss value 
contained in the policy or the historical average daily earnings and 
expenses. Thus, instead of hiring expensive forensic accountants to 
fight about the policyholder’s “probable” experience during the 
period of interruption, the policyholder or its accountant easily could 
do the calculation. Insurers also could easily confirm the accuracy of 
the calculation. 
Under these approaches, courts and juries similarly would not need 
to grapple with the issue of whether the policyholder has proven what 
“would have happened” to a “reasonable degree of certainty.”220 
What would have happened is moot. The past becomes the proxy for 
the future and it would be expressly stated in the policy. 
These proposals also would eliminate the windfall gain or unfairly 
low or non-existent claim payments that now occur when the 
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economic conditions post-catastrophe are considered for purposes of 
calculating the loss.
221
 The policyholder would not get a windfall 
benefit due to the increased demand for its product or services that is 
created by the catastrophe in some circumstances or an unfairly low 
or non-existent insurance payment when demand decreases in other 
circumstances. Instead, the policyholder would receive its continuing 
expenses and exactly what it had been earning before the catastrophe 
occurred. Using a daily loss value or only historical financial 
information would put the policyholder in the same position the 
parties agreed at the time of underwriting that the policyholder most 
likely would have been if the catastrophe had not occurred, which is 
the very purpose of business interruption insurance. 
Does the policyholder receive precisely what it would have 
received had the catastrophe not occurred under this proposal? It is 
impossible to know. One cannot predict the future with a high degree 
of accuracy, which is why the “reasonable degree of certainty” 
evidentiary standard is misplaced when attempting to value business 
interruption insurance losses under the existing policy language.
222
 
Nor can one create an accurate and complete picture of what a 
hypothetical world would have looked like in the absence of a 
catastrophe. The policyholder’s past, however, is known. Using the 
policyholder’s past as a proxy for the policyholder’s future provides a 
fair outcome for both the policyholder and the insurer in a situation 
where one hundred percent accuracy is not possible. 
Using a stated daily loss value or only the policyholder’s revenue 
and cost data for the three-year time period immediately preceding 
the loss when valuing the loss also should lead to consistent and 
predictable outcomes. Although insurers may be required to pay 
claims they might otherwise have chosen to litigate under the vague 
valuation provisions currently used in their policies, the outcome of 
disputes in which an insurer chooses to contest the payment of a 
claim under these proposals should be fairly predictable because the 
dispute would be decided under a bright line rule. Consequently, 
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insurers would be incentivized not to litigate claims they likely would 
lose in order to avoid incurring wasteful litigation costs. 
In addition to reducing the incentive to litigate, this predictability 
in the outcome of disputes would be beneficial to insurers as well 
because it would allow them to reserve for claims more accurately 
and to establish with more certainty the amount of premiums needed 
to cover claims and be profitable.
223
 Thus, this predictability also 
should result in cost savings for insurers. 
Using a stated daily loss value or only the policyholder’s historical 
revenue and cost data when valuing business interruption losses also 
should lead to a more cost-effective claims adjustment process. By 
using a bright line formula, the parties should not need to retain 
experts to engage in hypothetical debates regarding what would have 
happened had the catastrophe not occurred. Nor should the parties 
need to debate the impact the current state of the economy would 
have on the policyholder’s hypothetical earnings and costs. Nor, in 
most cases, should the courts and parties even need to conduct trials 
regarding the amount of the loss. Further, to the extent the parties 
cannot agree on the amount of the loss, the court in many instances 
nonetheless should be able to resolve the dispute on a motion for 
summary judgment because, assuming the facts are not in dispute, 
resolution of the dispute would be a question of law. The judge 
would only need to apply the daily loss value or the average 
historical earnings and expenses to the number of days the 
policyholder’s business was interrupted in order to determine the 
amount of the covered loss.
224
 Thus, few trials should be needed, and, 
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in most cases, the parties should be able to resolve the claims without 
even retaining experts or involving the courts. 
2.   Public Policy Considerations 
Public policy also favors using a stated daily loss value or only the 
historical earnings and costs of the policyholder when valuing 
business interruption losses. As an initial matter, no obvious public 
policy considerations favor the haphazard approach to valuing 
business interruption losses that currently exist. Nor would the 
typical theoretical concerns of insurers, such as adverse selection and 
moral hazard, be implicated if a stated daily loss value or only 
historical earnings and cost information were used.
225
 
Adverse selection in the insurance context is “the disproportionate 
tendency of those who are more likely to suffer losses to seek 
insurance against those losses.”226 Insurers already face adverse 
selection issues in the context of business interruption insurance 
because businesses that are located in areas prone to floods, 
hurricanes, or tornadoes naturally would be more incentivized to 
purchase business interruption insurance.
227
 Changing the loss 
valuation language, as proposed in this Article, however, should not 
impact that problem positively or negatively. 
Moral hazard is the tendency of a policyholder to take fewer 
precautions when insured.
228
 Another commentator has defined the 
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concept of “moral hazard” as a situation where “[a] 
person . . . deliberately causes a loss . . . [or] exaggerates the size of a 
claim to defraud an insurer.”229 
As a practical matter, there should be little concern by insurers that 
policyholders would attempt to artificially increase their historical 
earnings in anticipation of suffering losses due to events like 
hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods. Indeed, doing so would lead to 
higher premiums that the policyholders actually would hope they 
never recouped because the last thing a policyholder running a 
profitable business hopes for is that a hurricane, tornado, or flood 
will hit it. Further, even if policyholders were inclined and able to 
inflate the daily loss value, because policyholders do not create or 
control catastrophic events such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods, 
policyholders would not have the ability to cause the business 
interruption losses that most commonly occur. Consequently, moral 
hazard concerns would not be created by changing the loss valuation 
language in accordance with this proposal. 
Nonetheless, because daily loss values for business interruptions 
are established at the time of underwriting, insurers would be free to 
confirm or contest the accuracy of the cost and revenue numbers that 
underlie those calculations before accepting a premium for the 
policy.
230
 Moreover, because such numbers are annually updated 
during the policy renewal process, there is little risk of the numbers 
becoming outdated.
231
 Thus, any unlikely moral hazard concerns of 
the insurer could and should be resolved before the policy is placed. 
In addition, insurance fills the socially important and desirable role 
of protecting the limited assets of individuals and business owners 
against catastrophic losses by spreading and transferring the risk of 
such losses to well-capitalized insurers.
232
 Indeed, insurance is 
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integral to people’s lives and the conduct of business in modern 
industrial economies.
233
 Without insurance, people and businesses 
simply cannot function in today’s world. For example, anyone who 
wants to purchase a house using a bank to finance the mortgage is 
required to have homeowners insurance in an amount adequate to 
cover the mortgage.
234
 Anyone who wants to drive a car must have 
auto insurance.
235
 Most states require businesses to have worker’s 
compensation insurance.
236
 
Similarly, if someone wants to live or do business in areas prone to 
hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods, they need insurance to protect their 
homes and businesses. Without it, they risk bankruptcy with each 
passing storm. Further, if the business interruption insurance that is 
actually purchased by a business owner does not cover the business’s 
loss during a period of interruption, then the primary purpose of the 
insurance has failed and the business owner and society in general 
are in a worse position. Consequently, the adoption of either one of 
these proposals would ensure that business interruption insurance 
fulfills its important role in society. 
The long-standing public policy of enforcing contracts also favors 
the full payment of business interruption losses under insurance 
policies.237 Indeed, as one court correctly noted, in the area of insurance 
law, “[t]here is more than one public policy. One such policy is that an 
insurance company which accepts a premium for covering all liability for 
damages should honor its obligation.”238 Insurers draft the policies, 
which are then sold on a take-it-or leave-it basis.
239
 As drafters of the 
language contained in insurance policies, at a minimum, insurers should 
state in the policies, in clear terms, the specific way that business 
interruption losses will be valued. They have failed to do so and public 
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policy, as well as the rules of policy interpretation, dictates that insurers 
should not be given the benefit of the doubt in such circumstances in their 
quest to maximize their own profits.240 
Consequently, in light of the fact that the purpose of business 
interruption insurance is to protect the policyholder’s earnings in the event 
business operations are interrupted,241 public policy favors interpreting or 
using a loss calculation formula that ensures policyholders’ losses will be 
paid in full in the event of catastrophes. To do otherwise creates the very 
real possibility that policyholders could lose the reasonably expected 
coverage they bought, which expectation is consistent with the purpose of 
insurance generally and business interruption insurance specifically. 
Basic principles of fairness also dictate this result. Insurers should 
not be allowed to inconsistently apply the nebulous policy language 
they themselves drafted in a coverage-minimizing or coverage-
defeating manner depending upon whether the post-catastrophe 
economic conditions favor the policyholder. Nor should 
policyholders be required to prove the amount of their losses to a 
reasonable degree of certainty when such calculations are based upon 
a hypothetical world in which no interruption of the policyholder’s 
business occurs. In short, public policy favors an interpretation or use 
of a valuation provision that provides consistent, fair results. Using a 
stated daily loss value or only the three prior years of the 
policyholder’s revenue and cost data will provide consistent and fair 
results. 
Thus, insurers should redraft the valuation language in accordance 
with either of the proposals discussed in this Article. If they fail to do 
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so, then the courts should strictly construe the ambiguities in the 
existing language against insurers. If neither insurers nor courts are 
able to remedy the current problems, then legislatures need to enact 
statutes that dictate how business interruption losses will be valued. 
Indeed, history is replete with examples of legislatures acting to 
reverse unsatisfactory decisions by courts
242
 or insurers’ refusals to 
pay certain types of claims such as fire loss claims after the 1906 
earthquake in San Francisco
243
 or to provide health insurance to 
people who are sick.
244
 The valuation of business interruption losses 
may be another area of insurance law in which legislatures need to 
dictate the right solution if insurers and courts fail to do so. Of the 
two proposals set forth in this Article, the author submits that the 
easiest and fairest to apply would be to use a stated daily loss value 
because it is a number that is agreed to by the parties at the time the 
policy is purchased. 
CONCLUSION 
Business interruption losses can be enormous when a catastrophe 
or disaster occurs. How such losses are valued for insurance purposes 
can be the difference between a business surviving or failing. The 
loss valuation language currently used in business interruption 
policies provides almost no guidance regarding how such losses 
should be valued.
245
 This vacuum has resulted in unnecessary 
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litigation, the inefficient resolution of claims, and conflicting court 
decisions in which policyholders receive windfalls in some cases and 
nothing in other cases under similar fact patterns and policy 
language.
246
 
Under the existing rules of policy interpretation, any ambiguities 
in the policy language should be resolved in favor of the policyholder 
when a claim is presented, and the reasonable expectations of the 
policyholder should be fulfilled.
247
 Thus, because the existing loss 
valuation policy language is ambiguous, one solution to the problem 
of unfair loss valuations would be for courts to properly apply the 
rules of policy interpretation to the existing policy language, which 
should lead to inconsistent results that consistently favor the 
policyholder.
248
 
This Article, however, proposes better solutions. Instead of the ad 
hoc approach that currently exists, a better approach would be to use 
only the prior three years of the policyholder’s historical financial 
revenue and cost data to value such losses. An even better approach, 
however, would be to use the daily loss value that already is agreed 
to by the policyholder and insurer annually during the policy renewal 
underwriting process when the policy is purchased. Under either 
approach, the payment of business interruption losses would be 
consistent, fair, and predictable for both insurers and policyholders. 
Further, under both approaches, litigation would be unnecessary for 
most business interruption loss claims, which should be a welcome 
result for everyone . . . except litigators and forensic accountants. 
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